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In a previous article,
1
 I examined judicial opinions in cases in 
which law clerks have gone wild, principally by doing things that 
law clerks just aren‘t supposed to do, such as convening court,2 con-
ducting independent factual investigations into matters before their 
  
 * Adjunct Professor, The University of New Hampshire School of Law, Con-
cord, N.H.  By day, the author works as a law clerk for a federal judge. 
 1. See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Law Clerks Gone Wild, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173 
(2010); see also Parker B. Potter, Jr., Judges Gone Wild, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming) (discussing opinions in which judges have gone wild by referring to 
their law clerks in print); Parker B. Potter, Jr., The Rhetorical Power of Law 
Clerks, 40 SW. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming) (discussing the use of law clerks as a 
rhetorical device in judicial opinions).   
 2. See Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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judges,
3
 or leaking drafts of opinions to the press.
4
  Here, I focus on 
opinions in federal cases that discuss two other categories of unusual 
law-clerk activity, serving as a source of evidence, and going to 
court, as a litigant.
5
 
The article is informed by my ten years of experience as a trial-
court law clerk in the state and federal courts of New Hampshire.  
Things that caught my eye, and made it into the article, are incidents 
I read about in judicial opinions that struck me as very different from 
anything I had ever seen or heard about through the law-clerk grape-
vine.  My purpose is two-fold.  First, many of the opinions I discuss 
are downright entertaining.  But beyond that, the unusual fact pat-
terns that make those opinions entertaining also serve to point out 
things that might happen to a law clerk that are not covered in law 
school or the typical law-clerk training program.  Accordingly, I in-
tend for the article to have a practical dimension that underpins its 
entertainment value. 
In Part II, I explore opinions in which law clerks have become 
sources of evidence in cases they were working on, as producers of 
exhibits, as affiants, or as witnesses.  In discussing those opinions, I 
  
 3. See Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
 4. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 403–04 (Buckley, J., concurring). 
 5. I did come across one law clerk who was so far out of context that his situa-
tion defies categorization.  Specifically, the memorandum opinion in Bethea v. 
Bristol Lodge Corp. lists counsel for two of the defendants as follows: ―Robert M. 
Britton, Philadelphia, PA, Jason H. Casell, Law Clerk to the Honorable Michael 
M. Baylson, United States District Judge, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Godiva‘s Bris-
tol, Inc. and Divas Partners, Inc.‖  No. Civ.A. 01-612, 2003 WL 21146146, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. May 19, 2003).  And, just in case reading about Judge Baylson‘s law 
clerk appearing before another judge in the same district is not titillating enough, 
one needs only read the second paragraph of the opinion to discover that one of 
law clerk Casell‘s clients was associated with ―Divas International Gentlemen‘s 
Club . . ., a restaurant and bar that provides entertainment in the form of topless 
dancing.‖  Id.; cf. Doctor John‘s, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 
1027 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (judge sent law clerks out to examine ―adult book store‘s 
storefront display‖); Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted, 370 F. Supp. 506, 507–08 
(D.N.J.), rev’d, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974) (unpublished table decision) (judge 
sent law clerks on ―fact finding mission‖ to establishment offering ―nude interpre-
tive dancing‖).  Talk about law clerks out of context, not to mention a pretty nifty 
use of the ―cf.‖ signal! 
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focus on both the process by which law clerks have become sources 
of evidence and the topics on which they have been asked to give 
evidence.  Part III is devoted to cases in which law clerks have been 
litigants, and it serves as a guide to situations in which litigation is, 
and is not, a productive option for a law clerk who believes that he 
or she has been wronged. 
 
II. I SPY WITH MY LAW CLERK‘S EYE 
 
As a law clerk, I am accustomed to reading affidavits and listen-
ing to witness testimony.  Making affidavits and giving testimony, 
however, are beyond my range of experience.  And, indeed, the gen-
eral rule is that information law clerks may have acquired during the 
course of their work as law clerks is inaccessible as evidence.  As 
Judge Gilberto Gierbolini helpfully explained: 
Equally meritless is appellant‘s contention that hearsay 
considerations give appellant the right to cross-examine the 
judge‘s law clerk due to the judge‘s statement that the law 
clerk assisted her in interpreting the disclosure statement.  
Section 1 of the Federal Judicial Center’s Law Clerk Hand-
book, establishes in relevant part that: 
A law clerk is a lawyer employed to assist a judge 
with as many administrative, clerical, and basic legal 
tasks as possible, so as to leave the judge more time 
for judging and critical decision-making . . . . Many 
judges discuss pending cases with their law clerks 
and confer with them about decisions . . . . The bank-
ruptcy court clerk likewise participates in the broad 
range of tasks performed by the bankruptcy judge as a 
trial judge. 
Pp. 1-2. 
Clearly Judge de Jesús was entitled to seek and benefit 
from her law clerk‘s knowledge of accounting.  Moreover, 
we are convinced by the record that, as exemplified by her 
careful questioning of appellant‘s accountant, she never dele-
gated to her law clerk her duty to make the ultimate decision 
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in this case.  We remind appellant that law clerks are ―simply 
extensions of the judges at whose pleasure they serve.‖  Oli-
va v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988), citing Oliva v. 
Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  The presid-
ing judge at a trial may not testify as a witness in that trial.  
Rule 605 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Nor can a judge 
be subpoenaed to testify.  United States v. Alberico, 453 F. 
Supp. 178 (D. Colo. 1977).  Allowing cross-examination of a 
presiding judge would convert him or her into a witness.  See 
also Ouachita National Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291 
(8th Cir. 1982), on rehearing, 716 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983).  
Since a judge cannot testify in a case in which he/she is pre-
siding, it follows that the judge‘s law clerk, who is an exten-
sion of the judge, also may not testify. 
The above can be expressed in a classical Aristotelian 
syllogism: 
Major premise: An attorney cannot cross-examine the 
presiding judge regarding matters already decided or under 
the consideration of the judge; 
Minor premise: Law clerks are extensions of the judge. 
      Conclusion: An attorney cannot cross-examine a law 
clerk under the above premises.
6
 
In a recent case in which he allowed the counsel to a Special Master 
not to testify at a hearing conducted by the Special Master, Judge 
Eldon Fallon put things somewhat more succinctly: ―[T]his situation 
was the same or similar to the situation in which a party sought to 
call the Court‘s law clerk to testify which is routinely disallowed.‖7  
Indeed, subpoenas for law clerks seem to be quashed as a matter of 
course.
8
  In quashing the subpoenas at issue in Terrazas v. Slagle, 
Judge Sam Sparks elaborated, with considerable eloquence: 
  
 6. In re M.E.S., Inc., 148 B.R. 1, 3 (D.P.R. 1992). 
 7. Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 (E.D. La. 2008). 
 8. See, e.g., Terrazas v. Slagle, 142 F.R.D. 136, 140 (W.D. Tex. 1992); see also 
Loubser v. Pala, No. 4:04 CV 75, 2007 WL 3232136, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 
2007) (quashing ―non-party subpoena [served] on Kevin Smith, the Clerk of the 
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All counsel admit that public inquiries by the litigants as 
to the internal operations and communications of the Court 
will, not may, destroy the integrity of our present legal sys-
tem.  This Court will not be a party to that destruction.  
Clearly the object of deposing these law clerks is to disquali-
fy the judges, which power lies first with the judges them-
selves, and then with the United States Supreme Court or 
possibly the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event the 
Defendants choose to file a petition for writ of mandamus.  
Asking this judge to find deposing the judges‘ law clerks ne-
cessary under these circumstances is a usurpation of Judges 
Nowlin, Garwood, and Smith‘s authority and responsibilities.  
The judges, with full knowledge of the facts, have already 
determined there is no basis to require their recusal. 
     This Court will not be a party to permit the litigants to 
question law clerks of United States Judges and/or the United 
States Judges themselves with regard to their conduct in their 
determination of judicial decisions or their reasons for those 
decisions, and this Court will not be a party to assist the De-
fendants‘ counsel to disqualify these judges.9 
As Judge Harold Baer explained, in similar circumstances: 
I declined to grant Ms. Peters‘ request to have myself or my 
law clerk testify.  I noted that legal and policy considerations 
prevent a judge who is presiding over a trial from being 
called as a witness or subjected to discovery, and this applies 
to evidentiary hearings as well.  I noted, moreover, that Ms. 
Peters‘ motion for recusal further undercut her efforts to ob-
  
Indiana Supreme Court, seeking the names of all law clerks and cases on which 
each clerk worked during the course of a four-year period‖); United States v. Roe-
buck, 271 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (D.V.I. 2003) (―Judge Moore sua sponte quashed 
the subpoenas served on the law clerks as being unreasonable and unduly oppres-
sive.‖).  Roebuck involved, among other things, an attorney‘s attempt to have a 
judge recuse himself based upon her belief that the judge had responded negative-
ly to her letter to the editor opposing the judge‘s reappointment.  Id. at 714–15.  
For those who relish a good donnybrook between bench and bar, Roebuck is worth 
a read.  See also United States v. Roebuck, 289 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.V.I. 2003). 
 9. Terrazas, 142 F.R.D. at 139–40 (footnotes omitted). 
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tain the testimony of my law clerk . . . which is equally pro-
tected.  Where a litigant has sought to depose a law clerk in a 
case where a recusal motion is pending, courts have typically 
denied the testimony, as allowing the law clerk to testify 
would in most cases dictate recusal.
10
 
However, notwithstanding the general prohibition against ex-
tracting evidence from law clerks, law-clerk evidence in a variety of 
forms has found its way into court.  Sometimes, a judge will refer 
  
 10. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Scivantage, 525 F. Supp. 2d 448, 533 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (footnotes, citations, and internal punctuation marks omitted), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 564 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009).   
  In United States v. Ferguson, Judge Edward Weinfeld did disqualify himself, 
when a contrary decision would have placed him in the position of passing on the 
truthfulness of certain grand jury testimony offered by a former law clerk.  550 F. 
Supp. 1256, 1259–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).  According to Judge Weinfeld: 
The issue then is not the Court‘s own introspective capacity to sit in fair 
and honest judgment with respect to the controverted issues, but whether 
a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, might 
fairly question the Court‘s impartiality.  This is an objective standard and 
―where the question is close, the judge whose impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned must recuse himself from the trial.‖  My relationship to 
Pomerantz is so intimate and my esteem for him so high, as it is for all 
my many clerks through the years, that the ―average person on the street‖ 
might reasonably conclude that no matter how strongly the Court states 
that Pomerantz‘s testimony will not enter into its judgment, nonetheless, 
in some imperceptible manner his testimony will intrude itself and be 
considered with respect to the suppression motions.  This situation is 
quite unlike the prior motion to disqualify because a former law clerk had 
been assigned to prosecute the case.  The mere fact of close relationship 
did not require disqualification.  In this instance, however, credibility is a 
vital issue. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 526 F. Supp. 
1165 (E.D. Ark. 1981) presented a similar situation: 
Counsel for plaintiff countered with an affidavit to the effect that one of 
this Court‘s law clerks had advised him that it was all right to wait to file 
his request for an allowance of fees.  The law clerk involved filed his own 
affidavit, stating that no such advice had been given, whereupon this 
Court, feeling that it would give at least the appearance of impropriety for 
it to sit in judgment on the credibility of one of its own employees, re-
cused itself.  The case was then reassigned to another judge for a ruling 
on the then-pending question of attorneys‘ fees. 
Id. at 1167–68.  
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informally to being provided with information by law clerks.
11
  More 
frequently, a judge will make, or write, an off-hand comment about 
his or her reliance on the recollection
12
 or the notes
13
 of a law clerk 
  
 11. See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 243 n.15 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (―The fourth version [of a television commercial] continues to 
run, and all three of my law clerks saw it broadcast during the weekend of January 
1, 2005 at different times, including twice during the broadcast of the New York 
Giants-Dallas Cowboys football game.‖); In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Li-
tig., No. 95 C 7679, MDL No. 1083, 1996 WL 197671, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 
1996) (reporting ―what this Court‘s law clerk has reported that he heard on Na-
tional Public Radio‖); United States v. Kilpatrick, 575 F. Supp. 325, 341 (D. Colo. 
1983) (―[T]he atmosphere of the trial . . . was an atmosphere of unfairness and 
overreaching illustrated in small degree by ex parte telephone calls to my law 
clerk made by government counsel inquiring through the back door to learn my 
thinking as to some legal situations in the case.  (Colloquy about this appears in 
the record, and, consistent with their denials of what so many others say, govern-
ment counsel deny my law clerk‘s statements as to the conversation.)‖). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting 
that district judge had found that defendant was present in court based in part on 
―the judge‘s indication that his law clerk recalled that Sanchez had been present‖); 
Dominion Nutrition, Inc. v. Cesca, 467 F. Supp. 2d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (―I 
glanced over at the jury and saw juror B, still sitting on A‘s immediate right, swi-
vel toward A and smile or smirk.  I did not notice A‘s reaction, but my law clerks, 
who corroborated my observation, told me they‘d seen A nod emphatically in 
response to B.  Apparently no one else in the courtroom observed the incident.‖); 
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F. Supp. 
1013, 1020 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (―I have conferred with my law clerk, Mrs. Deere 
who has assisted me in this case, and she has no recollection of such a motion or 
order being given to her.‖); Farkas v. Ellis, 768 F. Supp. 476, 478 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (responding to plaintiff‘s claim, in motion to recuse, that he failed to quell 
―lewd hand gestures and offensive vocal insults‖ during conference, Judge Wil-
liam Connor noted that neither he ―nor his law clerk, who attended the conference, 
saw any such gestures‖); United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 n.2 
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (―Although there was not a court reporter present at the meeting, 
the Court and its two law clerks recall that the government did no more than 
present a ‗sales pitch‘ for a single trial.‖); Durflinger v. Artiles, 563 F. Supp. 322, 
327 (D. Kan. 1981) (―The Court did not exclude Dr. Dyck as a witness.  Unfortu-
nately, this dispute was resolved in chambers at a time when the court reporter was 
not present.  It is the Court‘s recollection, and that of two of his law clerks, who 
were present, that the Court stated that he could not exclude Dr. Dyck.‖).  But see 
Wolters Kluwer, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 456 n.28 (―Because Ms. Peters has put in issue 
ex parte and/or untranscribed conversations with myself or my law clerk by seek-
ing the testimony of myself or my law clerk regarding those conversations in con-
nection with her motion for my recusal, I will not rely on any independent recol-
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in reconstructing some aspect of a case.  Those references are of rel-
atively little interest other than as a gentle warning to law clerks to 
keep their notes legible and presentable.   
Of greater interest are cases in which law-clerk evidence has 
been introduced more formally.  In the following section, I begin 
with a discussion of cases in which documents generated by law 
clerks have become exhibits at a hearing or trial.  Next, I turn to cas-
es involving affidavits from law clerks.  I conclude with cases in 
which law clerks have been called upon to offer oral testimony.  As a 
bit of a leitmotif in my discussions of law-clerk affidavits and testi-
  
lection of myself or my law clerk as to the arguments Ms. Peters made in Cham-
bers at this time.‖). 
 13. See Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 685 F. Supp. 2d 557, 572 (W.D. Pa. 2010) 
(―[A]ccording to notes of the law clerk who attended the conference on December 
17, 2009, [plaintiffs‘ counsel] did not advise the Court of this commitment and we 
therefore find no reason to grant an additional extension on that basis.‖); Ass‘n 
Concerned About Tomorrow, Inc. v. Slater, 40 F. Supp. 2d 823, 826 (N.D. Tex. 
1998) (―Based on the pleadings, the evidence adduced at the July 1998 hearing, 
the stipulations, the arguments of counsel, the notes of the Court and the law clerk, 
the Court concludes that the Defendants have complied with the requirements of 
the National Environmental Policy Act . . . .‖); Adams v. Rivera, 13 F. Supp. 2d 
550, 551 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (―Plaintiff‘s attorney also contends that a conversa-
tion with Chambers caused him to believe, to his detriment, that if he and defense 
counsel were unable to agree upon fees, the Court would overlook the 14-day time 
limit in considering plaintiff‘s motion . . . . [T]he notes and recollection of the law 
clerk with whom plaintiff‘s counsel spoke clearly reflect that Chambers never 
stated or implied that a motion for attorneys‘ fees, if filed, would not be dismissed 
on timeliness grounds.‖); Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt, 918 F. Supp. 879, 905 
(D.V.I. 1996) (―THIS COURT issued an Opinion and Order in the above-
captioned case signed and dated February 15, 1996.  The Court subsequently 
learned that an error appeared on page 227 of Volume 2 of the transcript from the 
hearing on plaintiffs‘ motion for preliminary injunction . . . . This Court consulted 
its own recollection of the testimony, the law clerk‘s notes, and the affidavit of 
William M. Karr . . . . Each of these confirmed that thirty-two percent is the cor-
rect figure.  The Court reporter has issued a correction to the transcript.‖) (footnote 
omitted); Glover v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 808, 830 n.15 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (―I did 
not admit plaintiffs‘ exhibit 46 at the time it was marked.  There is no indication in 
the record that I admitted plaintiffs‘ exhibit 46 thereafter.  My handwritten bench 
notes, and those of my law clerk, are in accord that the exhibit was neither offered 
for admission nor admitted.  It appears that the court reporter, William Rittinger, 
did not appreciate the distinction between marking an exhibit for purposes of iden-
tification and admitting it into evidence.‖).  
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mony, I organize those sections on the basis of who sought the law 
clerks‘ evidence, beginning with cases in which that evidence has 
been elicited by parties and then moving to the more unusual situa-
tion in which evidence has been elicited by the court itself. 
A.  Exhibiting Law-Clerk Work 
It is one thing for a judge to make a passing reference to infor-
mation gleaned informally from a law clerk.  It is another thing for 
some bit of evidence created by a law clerk to make it into an opi-
nion as an actual exhibit.  Notwithstanding the general rule that law 
clerks are paid to examine exhibits rather than create them, there are 
more than a few examples of documents generated by law clerks that 
have become exhibits. 
The most common kind of law-clerk exhibit is a communication 
from a law clerk to a party that the party subsequently introduces as 
evidence.  For example, in Myers v. United States District Court,
14
 
the plaintiff in a civil case in the district court petitioned for a writ of 
mandamus after the district court set his case for trial without a jury, 
and he attached, as an exhibit to his petition, a letter from the trial 
judge‘s law clerk informing him that his letter to the judge ―inquir-
ing whether [the judge] had been inadvertent in eliminating the jury 
. . . would be deemed a jury demand and that ‗(a) jury (would) be 
called for the trial as a matter of course, without further action by 
counsel.‘‖15  The court of appeals issued the writ.16  In Berger v. 
Stinson,
17
 the federal judge ruling on a habeas corpus petition re-
ferred to a letter from the state trial judge‘s law clerk to show that, 
when ruling on the petitioner‘s motion for a new trial, the trial judge 
had not relied upon a particular bit of evidence.
18
  And, in United 
States ex rel. Walker v. Follette,
19
 a letter to a criminal defendant 
from the law clerk of the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Ap-
peals was introduced to demonstrate, in the context of a habeas cor-
  
 14. 620 F.2d 741, 742 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 15. Id. at 743. 
 16. Id. at 744. 
 17. 97 F. Supp. 2d 359 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 18. Id. at 362. 
 19. 274 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
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pus petition, that the defendant had exhausted his state remedies.
20
  
Communications from law clerks have also been cited in arguments 
that previous state-court convictions did not support a sentence en-
hancement in a subsequent federal case,
21
 that a prison had no basis 
for barring a prisoner from a work assignment he wanted because 
certain charges against him had been dropped,
22
 and that the federal 




Judges, as well, will cite to communications from law clerks to 
parties, typically to point out that a party has been placed on notice 
of some procedural aspect of a case, such as a request for supple-
  
 20. Id. at 182.  Also, in the habeas context, in Lindsey v. Cain, the only available 
documentation that a state trial court had denied a criminal defendant‘s claims for 
post-conviction relief was ―a minute entry indicating that the post-conviction ap-
plication submitted May 13, 2004 was denied by the court . . . and a letter from 
Judge Hunter‘s law clerk to petitioner stating that the post-conviction pleadings 
filed February 24, 2003 and again on May 13, 2004 had been denied.‖  Civil Ac-
tion No. 05-1593, 2009 WL 1575466, at *8 n.38 (E.D. La. May 29, 2009) (citation 
to the record omitted). 
 21. See United States v. Catlett, Nos. 4:05CR00275 SWW, 4:07CV01135 SWW, 
2008 WL 3271560, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 7, 2008) (―Catlett also submits a copy of 
a letter dated May 12, 2008, addressed to Catlett from a state court law clerk.  The 
letter reads as follows . . . .‖). 
 22. Nicholas v. Kanode, Civil Action No. 7:07-cv-00576, 2007 WL 4376145, at 
*1 n.3 (W.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2007) (―Plaintiff submits a copy of a letter . . . from a 
law clerk for the La Crosse County Circuit Court . . . indicating that charges 
against plaintiff were dismissed . . . .‖). 
 23. Dorsey v. Driver, Civil Action No. 1:07CV82, 2008 WL 4534351, at *1 
(N.D. W. Va. Oct. 7, 2008).  Moreover, in response to the Dorsey petitioner‘s 
challenge to the law clerk‘s credibility, Magistrate Judge John Kaull wrote: 
Of the three Judgment and Commitment Orders entered in petition-
ers‘ criminal case, not one of those orders states that the petitioner‘s D.C. 
sentence is to run concurrent to his violator sentence.  Moreover, accord-
ing to Judge Gardner‘s law clerk [Benjamin Kull], the audio of the peti-
tioner‘s sentence specifically refutes the petitioner‘s claims that the sen-
tencing judge intended for his sentences to run concurrent.  Although the 
petitioner questions the credibility of Judge Gardner‘s law clerk, the peti-
tioner has provided no evidence which would make this Court doubt the 
credibility or accuracy of Mr. Kull‘s statements of the case. 
Id. at *3. 
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mental briefing,
24
 ―the opportunity to comment on a proposed or-
der,‖25 the need to respond to a motion to dismiss,26 the option of 
delaying a trial,
27
 or the inapplicability of the limitation period estab-
lished by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA).
28
  While the most common type of law-clerk exhibit is a 
communication from a law clerk to a party, on relatively rare occa-
sion, an opinion has cited to more internal law-clerk communica-
  
 24. John Gil Constr., Inc. v. Riverso, 99 F. Supp. 2d 345, 356 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (citing ―letter from Rachel G. Skaistis, law clerk to Judge Scheindlin‖). 
 25. Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, Nos. 07 Civ. 1241(SAS), 07 Civ. 
7862(SAS), 2009 WL 454275, at *1 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2009) (citing 
―Email from Daniel Freeman, law clerk to Judge Scheindlin‖). 
 26. Cornish v. Norris Square United Presbyterian Cong‘n, No. 07-CV-3678, 
2009 WL 1492662, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2009). 
 27. Wood v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., No. 4:05-CV-00124GTE, 2006 WL 
897656, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 5, 2006). 
 28. Davidson v. United States, No. 00-CV-00869, 2000 WL 1772656, at *1 
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000).  In Davidson, the petitioner ―asked this court whether 
the then-newly enacted AEDPA would apply retroactively to him and, thus, re-
quire him to file his § 2255 motion by April 22, 1997.‖  Id.  ―By reply letter dated 
March 17, 1997, this court, by its law clerk, advised Davidson that language con-
tained in Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011 (2d Cir. 1997) and Reyes v. 
Keane, 90 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 1996) suggested that the AEDPA‘s statute of limita-
tions did not apply to him and, therefore, he would not need an extension of time 
to file his § 2255 motion.‖  Id.  Subsequently, both Lozada and Reyes were over-
ruled.  See id. at *1 n.1.  In response, the petitioner argued ―that, but for this 
court‘s letter assuring him that he was not subject to the one-year statute of limita-
tions, he would have timely filed his § 2255 motion.‖  Id. at *2.  The court agreed: 
Here, Davidson‘s detrimental reliance on this court‘s March 1997 let-
ter advising him that the statute of limitations did not apply to his § 2255 
motion constitutes a rare and exceptional circumstance which warrants 
equitable tolling.  If not for the letter, Davidson may have timely filed his 
motion.  In addition, Davidson cannot be faulted for the delay in filing his 
motion.  Davidson undoubtedly read this court‘s letter to mean that he 
was operating under § 2255 as it existed prior to the enactment of the 
AEDPA.  Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, of course, Davidson 
could have made his motion ―at any time.‖  See Mickens v. United States, 
148 F.3d [145,] 147 [(2d Cir. 1998)].  Given the rare circumstances sur-
rounding this motion, the court determines that Davidson acted with rea-
sonable diligence.  In sum, the court is compelled to equitably toll the sta-
tute of limitations and deem Davidson‘s submission timely filed. 
Id.  
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tions, including an e-mail from a law clerk to a clerk of court,
29
 a law 
clerk‘s ―minutes‖ of a settlement conference,30 a memorandum to 
chambers from a law clerk,
31
 and a memorandum for the file.
32
  In 
McGarvey v. Penske Automotive Group, Inc., one party made the 
bold move of relying on a law clerk‘s bench memo from another 
court.
33
  In the words of a rather incredulous Judge Jerome Siman-
dle: 
Perhaps as a result of the absence of authority interpreting 
section 2302(c), the parties devote considerable attention to a 
document submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their sum-
mary judgment motion, which Plaintiffs characterize as the 
opinion of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division in 
the matter of Baldino v. Classic Nissan of Turnersville, and 
which Defendants characterize as a bench memorandum 
from ―Matt Hill‖ to ―Judge Morgan‖ in that matter.  In the 
document, which is difficult to read and which is heavily 
marked with underlines and handwritten observations, Matt 
Hill appears to advise Judge Morgan that a warranty identical 
to that at issue herein ―likely violates the anti-tying provi-
sions of the MMWA because the underlying goal of preserv-
ing consumer choice is stifled.‖  Plaintiffs argue that the doc-
ument ―was adopted, along with its reasoning, as . . . [Judge 
  
 29. Byrne v. Liquid Asphalt Sys., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (―According to chamber‘s records, after the time allotted by the rules had 
passed without a response from Plaintiffs, the Court instructed the deputy clerk to 
call Plaintiffs‘ counsel.  This request is memorialized in an e-mail dated November 
14, 2002.  (E-mail from Alicia Huffman, law clerk to Judge Gregory Carman, to 
Susan Duong, deputy clerk for the Eastern District of New York (Nov. 14, 2002, 
09:45 EST) (on file with Judge Gregory W. Carman).).‖). 
 30. Schwartzman, Inc. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 694, 696 (D.N.M. 1996). 
 31. Lebron v. Powell, 217 F.R.D. 72, 73 (D.D.C. 2003) (―A memorandum to my 
chambers filed by my law clerk indicates that on August 23, 2000 I spoke to coun-
sel who advised me that they were creating a new proposed schedule.‖). 
 32. United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 196 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973) (―The state-
ment of facts of the incident [involving a jury question] is drawn from memoranda 
dictated by the trial judge, his law clerk and the deputy court clerk shortly after 
defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the delay in answering the [jury‘s] 
reasonable doubt note.‖). 
 33. 639 F. Supp. 2d 450, 458 n.9 (D.N.J. 2009).  
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Morgan‘s] determination in denying defendants‘ motion to 
dismiss in Baldino . . . .‖  In support of this argument, Plain-
tiffs‘ attorney, Simon Paris, Esq., states in a sworn certifica-
tion that he  
spoke to Ann Marie Cohen, New Jersey Superior 
Court-Law Division, Gloucester County, Civil Divi-
sion-Team Leader.  Ms. Cohen confirmed with Judge 
Morgan that the accompanying Memorandum of Law 
from Matt Hill . . . [was] incorporated into the Febru-
ary 18, 2005 Orders as the Court‘s basis for those Or-
ders.  
The Court will devote less attention to the Baldino docu-
ment than do the parties herein.  It is quite surprising that a 
party would urge this Court to place any weight upon a law 
clerk‘s bench memo that, by double hearsay, is said to have 
been adopted by a Superior Court judge, whose order is silent 
on the matter.  Even if the document were characterized as 
the ―basis‖ for the court‘s orders—a characterization that is 
belied by the form and contents of the document, notwith-
standing Mr. Paris‘ Certification—it would amount at most 
to persuasive authority, ―entitled only to that weight that its 
power to persuade compels.‖  Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla-
homa v. National Indian Gaming Com’n, 327 F.3d 1019, 
1043 (10th Cir. 2003).  The persuasive power of the Baldino 
document is limited—it devotes a perfunctory ten lines to the 
application of section 2302(c) to the IBEX warranty.  The 
Court thus does not rely upon that document in rendering its 
decision herein.
34
   
Finally, in a case in which several defendants sought her disqualifi-
cation, Judge Shira Scheindlin, in a survey of other cases with simi-
lar circumstances, quoted a newspaper article that quoted another 
judge‘s law clerk as saying: ―As soon as he was assigned the case, 
[Judge Dennis Montali] immediately undertook steps to sell those 
  
 34. Id. (citations to the record omitted). 
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stocks, and he sold them before any of the parties made any appear-
ance in this case and before he made any decision in this case.‖35 
B.  Law Clerk Saith What? 
The law-clerk exhibits discussed above are mostly documents 
created during the course of litigation but not for the purpose of liti-
gation.  An affidavit, on the other hand, is a document generated 
specifically for use in support of a pleading or at a hearing.  Thus, a 
law clerk who gives an affidavit is a giant step closer to the field of 
play than a law clerk whose letter to a litigant ends up being cited in 
a judicial opinion.  In this section, I discuss cases in which affidavits 
have been solicited from law clerks, with a focus on the subject mat-
ter of those affidavits. 
I begin with the most bodacious law-clerk affidavits of all time, 
the ones solicited by Judge Mitchell Cohen, from his law clerks, in 
Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted.
36
  In that case, in order to rule on the 
plaintiff‘s request for a temporary restraining order to prevent local 
law-enforcement officials from closing down his entertainment es-
tablishment, Club Lido, the court was required to determine whether 
―‗nude interpretive dancing‘ [is] embraced within the guarantees of 
Freedom of Speech under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.‖37  After a hearing on the plaintiff‘s request, ―an 
agreement was reached between the parties and the Court wherein 
the Club would be allowed to open on February 4, 1974 at which 
time a video tape would be made for the Court‘s review to determine 
if an injunction should issue.‖38  However, ―[m]uch to the dismay of 
the Court, technical developments occurred allegedly due to the jos-
tling of the cinematographer by the throngs of curious patrons, re-
sulting in an unsatisfactory viewing.‖39  As Judge Cohen further ex-
plained: 
  
 35. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 36. 370 F. Supp. 506, 507–08 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974) (un-
published table decision). 
 37. Starshock, 370 F. Supp. at 507. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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The tape, lacking the artistry of a Cecil B. DeMille produc-
tion, and the Court, mindful of the possible restraint em-
ployed by the entertainers with knowledge that their perfor-
mance was being taped for judicial scrutiny, dispatched its 
two law clerks, unannounced and unheralded, to the scene on 
a fact finding mission to make a more objective and compre-
hensive examination of the Club‘s activities . . . . It might be 
said that this mission was a far cry from the routine duties of 
a judicial law clerk.
40
 
Many other things might also be said, such as ―No Shinola, Sher-
lock!‖41  In any event, upon their return from the club, Judge Co-
hen‘s law clerks executed affidavits.42  Based on those affidavits, the 
videotape, and several still photographs, the judge made rather ex-
tensive factual findings
43
 and, based on those findings, ruled that the 
  
 40. Id. at 507–08.  Judge Cohen sent his law clerks, it seems, because ―a personal 
visit [by him] . . . was not deemed feasible.‖  Id. at 507.  Good call.  As judicial 
opinions go, Starshock has legs.  The trial judge in Expo, Inc. v. City of Passaic, in 
reliance on Starshock, sent the court‘s law clerks to view performances at an es-
tablishment called Top Tomato, ―as well as performances at nearby go-go shows.‖  
373 A.2d 1045, 1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). 
 41. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 752–53 (1978) (quoting George 
Carlin routine that identifies the typically brown animal waste product with which 
shinola shoe polish is sometimes confused); McIsaac v. State, No. 01-90-00894-
CR, 1992 WL 2257, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1992) (reporting defense attor-
ney‘s response to witness‘s answer on cross-examination: ―No [typically brown 
animal waste product], Sherlock.  Will you please answer my question.‖). 
 42. Starshock, 370 F. Supp. at 508.  Whether or not they also executed cold 
showers was discretely left undisclosed. 
 43. Id.  Among the more colorful are these: 
There are two girls dancing simultaneously—one in the center of 
each bar.  They apparently enter from an ―undressing‖ room located on 
the side of the Club.  As the girls walk from the room to the stage, they 
are covered with sheer negligee-type garments.  Upon reaching the stage, 
they disrobe and stand poised waiting for the first throbbing notes to 
sound.  The girls ―dance‖ to four numbers, then dress and leave.  They 
are, of course, immediately replaced by two new girls. 
The girls are completely nude as they gyrate with varying degrees of 
intensity.  They bump, grind and bounce to the strains of contemporary 
rock music while the audience looks on sipping their one dollar soft 
drinks, with expressions of deep thought, nervousness, or amusement.  
While the girls carefully avoided fondling themselves or carrying on con-
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club‘s nude interpretive dancing was not protected speech.44  Conse-




The most unsurprising topic of law-clerk affidavits, and presum-
ably the least contentious, is the realm of procedure.  In Anderson v. 
Keane,
46
 a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Colleen McMahon turned to an affidavit from the law 
clerk of a state trial judge (who had since died) in order to ascertain 
why an issue concerning verdict sheets had not been raised on direct 
appeal.
47
  The demise of a state-court judge also precipitated, at least 
in part, the procurement of law-clerk affidavits in Lucas v. United 
States,
48
 a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in 
which the circumstances surrounding a previous state-court convic-
tion were at issue: 
Unfortunately, as was noted above, there is no transcript 
of the state court proceeding.  In addition, the Honorable 
Marc Westbrook, the presiding judge in that proceeding, was 
killed in a car accident in 2005.  As such, the court must rely 
  
versations with the patrons, the movements of their generously endowed 
torsos left absolutely nothing to the imagination.  Indeed, those persons 
sitting at the bar were able to distinguish the quarter-inch letters of a tat-
too located on the derriere of one young lady which identified her as 
―Property of the Dragon‘s Motorcycle Gang.‖ 
Id. at 508. 
 44. Id.  He then elaborated: 
It is determined that the performances offered at the Club Lido fall 
far short of presenting an issue of ―speech‖ sufficiently important to out-
weigh the State of New Jersey‘s interest in curtailing nudity in public 
places.  In no way can the movements of the ―Ladies of the Ensemble‖ 
performed in unabashed nudity be considered an art form containing the 
slightest iota of ―self-expression.‖  ―Swan Lake‖, it was not!  Although 
advertised as ―Nude Interpretive Dancing‖, it was neither interpretive or 
dancing–just nude, a ―Go-go‖ performance bereft of outer dress.  What 
we have here is the cheap exploitation of human sexuality for purely 
commercial purposes. 
Id. at 509. 
 45. Id. at 510. 
 46. 283 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 47. Id. at 943. 
 48. Cr. No. 3:05-076-0-MBS, 2010 WL 412554 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2010). 
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on other evidence to determine whether Movant knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel prior to pleading 
guilty in his state court proceeding . . . . 
The government also produced evidence from two of 
Judge Westbrook‘s former law clerks.  The affidavit of Alan 
M. Wilson (―Wilson‖) indicates that ―it was Judge 
Westbrook‘s habit and routine practice to advise [ ] pro se 
defendants of their right to counsel, including the right to ap-
pointed counsel if they could not afford an attorney, as well 
as to make a finding that their waiver of counsel was volunta-
rily and intelligently made prior to accepting a guilty plea.‖  
In Wilson‘s opinion, Judge Westbrook ―would never have 
accepted a guilty plea without first having found on the 
record that the decision to plead guilty was freely, voluntarily 
and intelligently made.‖  The deposition of Judge Brian W. 
Jeffcoat, another former clerk of Judge Westbrook, indicated 
that Judge Jeffcoat never saw Judge Westbrook accept a 
guilty plea without first making a finding on the record that 
the guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made.  Judge Jeff-
coat further stated that Judge Westbrook took his time with 
pro se defendants to make sure they understood what was 
going on and did not wish to have an attorney. 
Movant produced the affidavit of Coconut Pantsari, who 
was the court reporter for Judge Westbrook the day Movant 
was sentenced.  Ms. Pantsari had no memory of Movant‘s 
guilty plea, but indicated that Judge Westbrook took pleas ra-
ther rapidly and that any warnings regarding the dangers of 
proceeding without an attorney given to Movant ―would have 
been perfunctory.‖ 
Based upon the foregoing evidence and looking at the 
record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant knowingly 





 49. Id. at *3–4 (citations to the record omitted). 
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The circumstances surrounding the entry of a default in a state-
court case were at issue in Sterling Factors, Inc. v. Whelan,
50
 in 
which U.S. District Judge Owen Forrester was faced with dueling 
affidavits from the law clerk and the attorneys involved in the state-
court proceeding.
51
  In Merit Finance Co. of Kingsport v. Service 
Finance Co. of Greenwood,
52
 Judge Robert Hemphill both cited and 
appended in full an affidavit from his law clerk to demonstrate that 
the defendants had been notified of a hearing on the plaintiff‘s mo-
tion for a default judgment.
53
  In Lehman v. United States,
54
 the 
―plaintiff and her counsel . . . filed affidavits averring that they were 
informed by the trial Judge‘s law clerk . . . that [the] plaintiff could 
remain at home . . . until she received a telephone communication 
from her counsel to come to Philadelphia for the trial.‖55  Judge 
Charles Kraft was not persuaded: ―This allegation is expressly con-
tradicted by the averments of an affidavit, filed by the law clerk [at] 
the Court‘s direction.‖56   





  There, Judge William Keller sanctioned 
an attorney under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
18 U.S.C. § 401, and the court‘s inherent power59 for, among other 
―pestiferous conduct,‖60 disobeying an order that he had issued.61  In 
support of his determination that the attorney understood his order, 
Judge Keller wrote: ―Yagman ignores the issue posited by the Court 
that any ambiguity with respect to the Court‘s request for copies of 
  
 50. 245 B.R. 698, 701 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 51. Id. at 702. 
 52. 38 F.R.D. 482 (D.S.C. 1965). 
 53. Id. at 483, 485; see also N‘Jai v. Floyd, Civil Case No. 07-1506, 2009 WL 
1531594, at *11 & n.26 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2009) (citing affidavits from judge‘s 
courtroom deputy clerk and former law clerk as well as the court‘s data quality 
analyst, Unix/Linux systems administrator, and webmaster/trainer to demonstrate 
that court had ―heard nothing further from Plaintiff in the next 30 days‖). 
 54. 313 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
 55. Id. at 250. 
 56. Id. at 250 n.1. 
 57. 137 F.R.D. 310 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
 58. Id. at 311. 
 59. Id. at 311–12. 
 60. Id. at 318. 
 61. Id. at 317. 
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the papers in Manuel L. Real, Chief Judge, United States District 
Court for Central District of California v. Stephen Yagman was cla-
rified telephonically by my law clerk.‖62  Judge Keller cited the dec-
laration of his law clerk,
63
 which he appended in full,
64
 and then, for 
good measure, he explained that ―[i]t is appropriate for a court to 
consider the conduct of the Judge‘s law clerk.‖65  In the end, the 
sanctions did not stick.  As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the order 
by Judge Keller that attorney Yagman supposedly disobeyed ―specif-
ically requested a complaint and pleadings which did not exist.‖66  
The court of appeals then explained: ―It was objectively impossible 
for Yagman to comply with the terms of the written order.  Though 
the court‘s law clerk may have requested other documents, this re-
quest was not part of the court‘s order and therefore cannot serve as 
the basis for a finding of contempt.‖67  On that basis, the Ninth Cir-





 62. Id. at 315. 
 63. Yagman, 137 F.R.D. at  315 n.4. 
 64. Id. at 319–20. 
 65. Id. at 315 n.4 (citing Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc‘ns Enters., Inc., 
498 U.S. 533, 545–46 (1991)).  
 66. Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  Attorney Yagman continued to tangle with Judge Keller.  Shortly after 
Judge Keller sanctioned him, ―Yagman was quoted as saying that Judge Keller 
‗has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: me, David Kenner and Hugh 
Manes.  I find this to be evidence of anti-semitism.‘‖  Standing Comm. on Discip-
line v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).  Yagman was found to have 
told a reporter ―that Judge Keller was ‗drunk on the bench.‘‖  Id.  Regarding the 
―drunk on the bench‖ comment: 
The primary evidence . . . consist[ed] of testimony from one of Judge 
Keller‘s former law clerks.  The law clerk testified that a reporter called 
the chambers seeking comment on Yagman‘s ―drunk on the bench‖ 
statement.  The witness did not claim he had spoken with the reporter 
himself; rather, he testified that the reporter spoke to his co-clerk and that 
he (the witness) happened to be in the room with the co-clerk when the 
call came in.  The witness did not explain how he came to know what the 
reporter was saying at the remote end of the telephone line, but presuma-
bly he was testifying as to what the co-clerk said the reporter said Yag-
man said. 
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Law clerks have also been asked to give affidavits to document 
things they did, or did not do, in particular cases.  For example, in 
Porcaro v. United States,
69
 ―[t]he government filed affidavits from 
both the law clerk and the courtroom clerk who said they never dis-
cussed possible sentences with petitioner or his counsel or said that 
he would receive a one year sentence if he plead guilty.‖70  And in 
McCulloch v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.,
71
 in which 
the plaintiff moved for Judge Alan Nevas‘s recusal based on the 
post-clerkship employment of one of his law clerks, the judge soli-
cited an affidavit from that former law clerk that explained his in-




Among the more interesting law-clerk affidavits are those in 
which law clerks have provided testimony concerning the conduct of 
  
Id. at 1441 n.20 (citation omitted).  For the conduct described above, as well as 
other intemperate remarks about Judge Keller, and after a hearing at which Judge 
Keller‘s former law clerk testified, the Standing Committee on Discipline for the 
Central District of California suspended Yagman from practice in the district.  Id. 
at 1433.  The Ninth Circuit reversed.  Id. at 1445.  Yagman 2, Judge Keller 0. 
 69. 832 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 70. Id. at 213. 
 71. No. 3:01CV1115(AHN), 2005 WL 3144656 (D. Conn. Nov. 23, 2005). 
 72. Id. at *2.  In McCulloch, the plaintiff‘s attorney claimed that ―the Court‘s 
new law clerk told him that the law clerk who was working on the case had left 
and had taken the court file with him so that he could finish the pending motions.‖  
Id. at *1.  According to the former law clerk‘s affidavit: 
At the time his clerkship ended on September 1, 2005, his work on this 
case was substantially finished.  He did not take the court file with him 
when he left.  He commenced his employment with the Firm on Septem-
ber 6, 2005.  After he started working at the Firm he had no substantive 
discussions about this case with the Court and did not discuss the merits 
of the pending motions with the Court.  His work consisted of finishing 
up the drafts, primarily editing and doing some minor research.  He sub-
mitted his drafts to the Court sometime during the last week of September 
2005. 
Id. at *2.  Judge Nevas added: ―The drafts he submitted were revised, edited, and 
reviewed by the Court before they were issued on September 29 and 30, 2005.‖  
Id.  While there is no reason to fault Judge Nevas‘s determination that recusal was 
not warranted, it is not difficult to see the problems that can arise when work on 
judicial opinions is conducted by those other than court employees, such as law-
yers working for private firms.  Note to self: Remember to complete all unfinished 
work before leaving clerkship. 
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their judges.  In Greer v. Minnesota,
73
 a habeas corpus proceeding 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the petitioner 
obtained and submitted affidavits from two law clerks for the 
[state-court] trial judge who stated that ―the trial judge ap-
peared ‗visibly angry at defense counsel‘ during Greer‘s trial; 
that he told them he had ‗denied defense counsel‘s challenges 
for cause because he was angry with them‘; and that, con-
trary to his common practice he had not sent jury question-
naires to the attorneys.‖74 
Clearly, there were some pretty interesting goings on during and af-
ter Mr. Greer‘s trial but, sadly for students of trial advocacy and ha-
beas practice, the Greer opinion says little more than what I have 
quoted and leaves much to the imagination, including just how the 
petitioner got such crucial (and critical) affidavits from the trial 
judge‘s law clerks.  While the Minnesota Supreme Court ―did con-
clude that it was ‗unlikely that the law clerks‘ affidavits would have 
formed the basis for removal of Judge Crump,‘‖75 it ultimately de-
termined that the claim supported by the law-clerk affidavits was 
procedurally barred, thus preventing both it, and the federal habeas 
court, from reaching that claim on the merits.
76
 
Perhaps the most noteworthy law-clerk affidavits were those giv-
en by the law clerks of Judge Paul Riley of the Southern District of 
Illinois.  According to Judge Richard Mills, ―[t]he late Paul E. Riley, 
United States District Judge for the Southern District of Illinois, had 
a penchant for communicating ex parte with jurors in cases in which 
he was the presiding judge.‖77  In at least seven cases, criminal de-
fendants convicted after jury trials before Judge Riley moved for 
  
 73. 493 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 74. Id. at 956. 
 75. Id. at 957 (quoting Greer v. State, 673 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. 2004)). 
 76. Greer, 493 F.3d at 957–58.  While no court ever had to consider the affida-
vits given by Judge Crump‘s law clerks, Judge Crump was subjected to another 
kind of wildness; he and six jurors gave testimony at a post-trial Schwartz hearing.  
Id. at 955–56.  (―In Minnesota courts, a Schwartz hearing is used when jury impar-
tiality is disputed and allows for the examination of the jurors on the record in the 
presence of counsel for all parties.‖  Id. at 956 n.3 (citing Schwartz v. Minneapolis 
Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960))). 
 77. United States v. Hodges, 189 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (S.D. Ill. 2002). 
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new trials based in part on Judge Riley‘s ex parte communications 
with jurors, and, in those cases, law-clerk affidavits were offered as 
evidence of the communications at issue.   
In United States v. Davis,
78
 Judge Riley‘s permanent law clerk, 
Sheila Hunsicker, testified by affidavit that the judge excused the 
defendant and counsel from the courtroom, but remained, along with 
her, ―while the jurors viewed the firearms and ammunition marked 
as exhibits in the case.‖79  She further testified: 
[W]hile the jury was viewing the exhibits, Judge Riley 
questioned whether the Defendant could have concealed all 
of the weapons under his trench coat.  I walked over to Judge 
Riley and asked him to not talk to the jurors while they were 
looking at the exhibits.  He got mad, pointed toward the door, 




Charles Davis got a new trial.
81
  United States v. Von Briggs
82
 in-
volved similar circumstances and the same law clerk: 
Judge Riley informed Von Briggs and counsel that they 
would be excused from the courtroom while the jurors 
viewed the drugs and the firearms marked as exhibits in the 
case but that he would remain to ensure that no one ingested 
any of the narcotics and that no one was shot with one of the 
firearms.  According to her affidavit, Sheila Hunsicker also 
remained in the courtroom while the jury viewed the evi-
dence.  Hunsicker testified that while the jury was viewing 
the exhibits, she observed Judge Riley inform one of the ju-
rors that certain markings on a gun clip (which had been ad-
mitted into evidence) were not very important or did not real-
ly matter.  In addition, Hunsicker testified that she noticed 
Judge Riley interacting with the jurors as they viewed the 
  
 78. 109 F. Supp. 2d 991 (S.D. Ill. 2000). 
 79. Id. at 993. 
 80. Id. at 996. 
 81. Id. at 997. 
 82. 109 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (S.D. Ill. 2000). 
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evidence and observed him making facial expressions which 
she believed revealed his anti-prosecutorial sentiments.
83
 
Like Davis, Marlenhuff Von Briggs got a new trial.
84
  And in United 
States v. Quilling,
85
 Gary Quilling got a new trial based in part on 
law clerk Hunsicker‘s affidavit, which corroborated a court report-
er‘s affidavit testimony that ―she observed Judge Riley telling the 
jurors in Quilling‘s case that ‗this is ridiculous‘ . . . [and] that Judge 
Riley made derogatory remarks to the jury . . . regarding the Gov-
ernment‘s attorney.‖86 
Judge Riley‘s other four cases that went before Judge Mills in-
volved Judge Riley‘s other law clerk, David Agay.87  In each case, 
Judge Mills wrote something like this: 
During an interview by Chief Judge Gilbert, Agay informed 
Chief Judge Gilbert that, during his tenure as Judge Riley‘s 
law clerk, he assisted Judge Riley in only four trials: United 
States v. Bradley, 98-30149, United States v. Bishawi, 97-
40044, United States v. Alexander, 99-30067, and United 
States v. Hodges, 99-40009.  Of those four trials, Agay had a 
specific recollection that Judge Riley entered the jury room 
and spoke with the jury while they were deliberating in three 
of the four cases, although he could not specify in which of 
the three cases the improper contact had occurred.  Moreo-
ver, in his affidavit, Agay testified that ―[o]n some occasions, 
I was not present in chambers when the jury sent a note.  
Sometimes, Judge Riley would receive the note, read it, go 
into the jury room, and close the door.‖88  
He then added something like this: 
  
 83. Id. at 1005–06 (footnote omitted). 
 84. Id. at 1008. 
 85. 109 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (S.D. Ill. 2000). 
 86. Id. at 1011. 
 87. See United States v. Alexander, 110 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 (S.D. Ill. 2000); 
United States v. Bishawi, 109 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (S.D. Ill. 2000); United States 
v. Bradley, 109 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (S.D. Ill. 2000); United States v. Hodges, 
110 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771 (S.D. Ill. 2000). 
 88. Hodges, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
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In addition, Agay testified that he ―observed Judge Riley 
speaking to jurors outside the courtroom on several occa-
sions.‖  Although Agay went on to say that the discussions 
merely concerned mundane matters such as the weather, giv-
en Judge Riley‘s improprieties with juries in other cases, the 
Court is concerned that even these, perhaps, innocent con-
tacts with the juries might have had an influence on the ju-
ries‘ partiality despite Agay‘s statement that he did not see or 
hear Judge Riley discuss the substances of any case during 
these contacts.  At a minimum, given the circumstances sur-
rounding these seven cases and Judge Riley‘s medical condi-
tion, it leaves one with the impression that ―[s]omething is 
rotten in the state of Denmark.‖89 
Judge Mills granted new trials to the defendants in Hodges, Alexan-
der, Bishawi, and Bradley,
90
 but, in Bishawi and Hodges, the gov-
ernment appealed successfully and, after evidentiary hearings on 
remand, prevailed in the district court, on grounds that Ahmad Bi-
shawi and Carlan Hodges had not been harmed by Judge Riley‘s ex 




 89. Id. at 772–73 n.6 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 4). 
 90. Alexander, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 768; Bishawi, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1004; Brad-
ley, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Hodges, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
 91. United States v. Bishawi, 186 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893–94 (S.D. Ill. 2002) 
(―[S]everal jurors testified that Judge Riley came into the jury room and/or into the 
jury‘s break room and spoke with them about the weather, about television pro-
grams, and about why the trial had been cancelled one day.‖); United States v. 
Hodges, 189 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (S.D. Ill. 2002) (―[T]he juror who testified that 
Judge Riley entered the jury room during deliberations stated that Judge Riley was 
only in the jury room briefly (about a minute or as long as it takes to walk into the 
kitchen to get a soft drink out of the refrigerator), that Judge Riley did not say 
anything or make any unusual gestures, and that, although he thought it peculiar 
for Judge Riley to be in the jury room during the deliberations, Judge Riley‘s pres-
ence did not affect the verdict‖).  While Judge Mills ruled in favor of the govern-
ment in Bishawi and Hodges, he made no secret of his opinion of Judge Riley‘s 
conduct, calling it ―inappropriate and unbecoming a judicial officer . . . [and] a 
disservice to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, 
to the legal profession, and to the federal judiciary.‖  Hodges, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 
861.  He concluded: ―Judge Riley‘s conduct in this cause is not to be counte-
nanced; his actions reflect adversely upon the integrity of the judicial system.‖  Id. 
at 862; see also Bishawi, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 895. 
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Notwithstanding the examples discussed above, there are at least 
some law-clerk affidavits about judicial conduct that are not critical 
of the judges they discuss.  For example, in Hathcock v. Navistar 
International Transportation Corp.,
92
 Judge Ross Anderson re-
sponded to the defendant‘s motion to recuse him for bias by solicit-
ing an affidavit from his law clerk ―stating that the court in large 
measure had adopted the factual predicate from the proposed order 
drafted by the [plaintiff‘s] counsel, but had drawn independent legal 
conclusions.‖93  Judge Anderson denied the motion.94  The court of 




Though probably insufficient to merit recusal in isolation, the 
judge‘s ex parte contacts requesting the Hathcocks‘ counsel 
to draft at least the factual basis of a default order, and possi-
bly its legal conclusions as well, do not foster an impression 
of objectivity, particularly since Navistar was never given an 
opportunity to respond to the proposed order.  We are also 
troubled by the judge‘s willingness to involve the court as a 
participant in ongoing litigation by directing his law clerk to 




The law-clerk affidavit in United States v. Zichettello
97
 neither 
criticized the law clerk‘s judge nor praised her.98  Rather, that affi-
davit, along with one from the judge,
99
 merely purported to describe 
the process by which jury instructions were prepared in chambers,
100
 
which, ultimately, the court of appeals found wanting.
101
  While the 
  
 92. 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 93. Id. at 39. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 41. 
 96. Id. (citation omitted).  
 97. 208 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 98. Id. at 92. 
 99. Id. at 89. 
100. Id. at 89–92. 
101. Id. at 97–98.  The court concluded: ―[W]hether we have the power to order a 
change in such a practice is unclear.  We review judgments, and our review of the 
convictions and sentences here may not be an appropriate vehicle for the fine tun-
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court‘s description of the instruction-preparation process, including 
the law clerk‘s role therein, and the court‘s appraisal of the law 
clerk‘s affidavit102 are of moderate interest, at least to those who help 
prepare jury instructions, the real law-clerk wildness in Zichettello 
involved the way in which the issue came to light in the first place: 
On April 9, after the government‘s [appellate] brief had 
been filed, the government moved to ―correct the record so 
that it reflects the charge given to the jury . . . .‖ 
 Three days after the government‘s brief was filed, the 
person who had served as the trial judge‘s law clerk (―Law 
Clerk‖) during the trial—he had left in September 1998, after 
two years of service—encountered a former Assistant United 
States Attorney (―AUSA‖) who had been one of the lead 
prosecutors in the case.  The occasion was a social event at 
Fordham Law School.  The AUSA and her husband, a Ford-
ham law professor (―Law Professor‖), depicted the ensuing 
conversation as follows.  The AUSA told the Law Clerk that 
she did not remember the district judge giving the instruc-
tions described in Point I of the appellants‘ brief.  The Law 
Clerk said that he also did not remember them.  The Law 
Professor recalled the Law Clerk also saying he had actually 
returned to the judge‘s chambers and found that the instruc-
tions in the ―script‖ read to the jury by the judge were differ-
ent from those in the transcript upon which the appellants‘ 
brief relied.  The Law Clerk recalls the conversation with the 
AUSA and remembers telling her that he believed that the 
charge described by appellants was correct on the law.  He 
does not recall mentioning a script or saying that the lan-
guage in question was not in the script. 
This conversation prompted the government to inquire 
further into the charge issue.  Days later, the government 
communicated with the court reporter, Vincent Bologna, who 
had transcribed the jury instructions.  Bologna told the gov-
  
ing of this practice.  However, we invite the judges of the Southern District to 
consider revision.‖  Id. at 98 (footnote omitted). 
102. Id. at 94–97. 
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ernment that the language challenged by appellants was not, 
in his view, actually read to the jury.  Based on this and doc-
uments provided by Bologna, the government concluded that 
there was compelling evidence that the record certified to this 
court was in error on an issue material to the appeal. 
The AUSA contacted the attorneys who represented ap-
pellants at trial and asked them whether they remembered 
hearing the challenged language during the jury charge.  The 
attorneys all stated in substance that they did not remember 
whether the district court actually uttered the challenged 
words.  The government thereafter contacted appellants‘ ap-
pellate counsel to seek their consent to amend the transcript 
and strike Point I of the Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer brief.  
Understandably, appellate counsel did not consent to the re-
quest.  Accordingly, the government filed the present motion 
to amend in this court.  We thereafter invited the district 
judge to submit her version of events in writing.  She re-
sponded with an affidavit and submitted as well an affidavit 
of the Law Clerk.
103
 
While the court of appeals had much to say about many aspects of 
the trial court‘s practices and procedures, it reported, without com-
ment, the conversation at the Fordham social event at which the for-
mer law clerk spilled a few more legumes than I would have let out 
of my bean pot in a similar situation. 
I conclude this section with an affidavit-assisted trip from the 
frying pan straight into the fire.  In Jones v. Clinton
104
 (yes, that 
Clinton), one of the House Managers of the presidential impeach-
ment trial contacted Judge Susan Webber Wright, who was presiding 
over Paula Jones‘s suit against President Clinton, and told Judge 
Wright that he was thinking about calling her as a witness in the im-
peachment trial.
105
  Judge Wright was never asked to testify,
106
 but 
her law clerk was not so lucky: ―Later, a representative of the House 
Managers requested and, with my permission, received an affidavit 
  
103. Zichettello, 208 F.3d at 88–89 (citations to the record omitted). 
104. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999). 
105. Id. at 1124 n.11. 
106. Id. 
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concerning the President‘s deposition from my law clerk, Barry W. 
Ward, who attended the President‘s deposition.‖107  Law clerks have 
given a few affidavits over the years, but it will be quite a long time, 
I suspect, before any law-clerk affidavit can top the one Barry Ward 
gave. 
C.  From the Mouths of Law Clerks 
The final step in the transformation from observer to participant, 
from law clerk to witness, occurs when a court takes formal testimo-
ny from a law clerk.  Like the previous section, this section is orga-
nized primarily on the basis of the topics on which law clerks have 
been asked to testify.  Those topics include, among others, issues 
related to the operation of juries, other trial-related procedural mat-
ters, the imposition of sanctions on attorneys and judges, and deter-
minations of competence. 
 
1. Jury Issues 
 
Law clerks have been called to testify about jury-related issues in 
a variety of ways, sometimes during the course of trial by the presid-
ing judges for whom they worked, sometimes after the fact. 
United States v. Bradley
108
 involved the removal of a juror 
named Jefferson for sleeping during trial.
109
  Before the sleeping 
issue arose, Jefferson was moved from one spot in the jury box to 
another because of ―an odor problem,‖110 and ―[l]ater the Assistant 
United States Attorney told the court he thought that Jefferson was 
eating paper.‖111  After another juror told the court, under oath, that 
she had overheard Jefferson say that she had made up her own mind 
and would not listen to the court, ―[t]he court then told the parties 
that it had noticed Jefferson sleeping.‖112  Thereafter, the court 
  
107. Id. 
108. 173 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999). 
109. Id. at 228. 
110. Id.  
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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swore in one of its law clerks, who testified that during the 
government‘s closing, she had noticed Jefferson sleeping.  
The defendants had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
clerk but did not do so.  The court expressed its desire to 




Subsequently, ―[t]he court . . . stated that it had observed that Jeffer-
son had not been paying attention during the defendants‘ summa-
tion.‖114  The defendants then ―urged the court to examine Jeffer-
son.‖115  It declined to do so and dismissed her from the jury without 
questioning her.
116
  The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that it was 
not improper for the trial court to dismiss Jefferson for sleeping 
without a voir dire of her: 
The court had a legitimate basis to dismiss Jefferson.  
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c), a court may dismiss jurors if 
they ―become or are found to be unable or disqualified to 
perform their duties.‖  The defendants argue that the court‘s 
stated reason for dismissing Jefferson, that she was sleeping, 
was only a ―pretext,‖ and that the court and the government 
had singled her out and were looking for ways to remove her.  
But the record shows that the court dismissed her for inabili-
ty to serve as a juror, and that the court had sufficient infor-
mation to support the dismissal and so did not have to voir 
dire her or the other jurors with respect to this point.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d [1384,] 1395 [(3d Cir. 
1994)]; United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
The defendants downplay the fact that the court itself no-
ticed Jefferson sleeping: first, when it overheard someone 
snoring loudly during the government‘s summation, then, 
when it observed Jefferson snoring during the defendants‘ 
summation; thus, its dismissal was not solely based on its law 
  
113. Id. at 228–29. 
114. Bradley, 173 F.3d at 229. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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clerk‘s observations.  The court could take judicial notice of 
the conduct of a juror in open court.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Carter, 433 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1970).  Moreover, the 
court did not base its decision on ex parte communications 
with its clerk.  Rather, it put the clerk on the stand to be 
cross-examined.  The defendants refused to question the 
clerk, and now argue that this is because they did not want to 
risk attacking the court through its extension, the clerk.  Yet 
the defendants‘ attorneys were quite willing to argue with the 
court itself regarding its observation that Jefferson was sleep-
ing, and were willing to question whether the court had ob-
served other jurors sleeping as well.
117
  
In Otis Elevator Co. v. Coyle Realty Co.,
118
 the issue was whether 
the jury had been ―improperly coerced or subjected to undue influ-
ence.‖119  The trial court held a post-trial hearing on that issue, at 
which the following transpired: 
The jury foreman testified that the bailiff physically pushed 
him back into the jury room, and that the jury was forced to 
deliberate after it had clearly reached an impasse as if a ver-
dict were a condition of release from ―prison.‖  The fore-
man‘s testimony was contradicted by several witnesses at the 
post-trial hearing.  The law clerk of the judge presented un-
controverted testimony that when she told the foreman that 
the presiding judge would declare a mistrial and dismiss the 
jury, he requested additional time for deliberation.
120
 
In United States v. Florea,
121
 a law clerk was called by his or her 
judge, in a hearing held on the day a criminal defendant was sen-
tenced, to describe the manner in which certain tape recordings were 
played for a jury during its deliberations.
122
  In Cigna Fire Under-
  
117. Id. at 230. 
118. 838 F.2d 467 (unpublished table decision), 1988 WL 4623 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 
1988).  
119. Id. at *1. 
120. Id. 
121. 541 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1976). 
122. Id. at 570–71. 
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writers Co. v. MacDonald & Johnson, Inc.,
123
 Judge Douglas Wood-
lock took testimony from a number of people, including a law clerk 
to Judge Frank Freedman, at a hearing to determine whether Judge 
Freedman had had ex parte contact with the jury during a trial he had 
conducted.
124
  Finally, in what can only be described as an extraor-
dinary habeas corpus proceeding, Judge Charles Briant held an evi-
dentiary hearing on the issue of racial composition of juries in New 
York state-court criminal proceedings in which he heard from, 
among others, ―a former law clerk to a state Supreme Court Justice 
in Bronx County who testified, based on his observations of 12 to 15 
voir dires from 1978 to 1980, that 60 to 75% of the jurors called 
were dark skinned.‖125 
 The cases discussed above are all appellate opinions discussing 
law-clerk testimony taken in the court below.  There are, however, 
several district-court opinions in which judges discuss testimony 
they have taken from their own law clerks.  In United States v. 
Kohne,
126
 Judge Rabe Marsh sequestered the jury in a criminal case 
and had three jury attendants ―sworn to safeguard the jury.‖127  One 
of those attendants was his law clerk.
128
  After one juror submitted a 
written statement claiming coercion by other jurors,
129
 and the de-
fendants filed a motion for a new trial,
130
 Judge Marsh held a hearing 
at which he questioned the jury attendants, including his law clerk.
131
  
In United States v. Lopez-Martinez,
132
 Judge Stephen McNamee held 
a post-trial evidentiary hearing on a criminal defendant‘s motion for 
a new trial, at which he questioned a law clerk of his who had ―dis-
covered a piece of paper containing legal terms and definitions‖ in 
  
123. 86 F.3d 1260 (1st Cir. 1996). 
124. Id. at 1272–73.  Judge Woodlock determined that ―Judge Freedman had no 
secret communication with the jury outside the presence of counsel.‖  Id. at 1273. 
125. Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 219 (2d Cir. 1987). 
126. 358 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Pa. 1973). 
127. Id. at 1048 n.2. 
128. Id. at 1048. 
129. Id. at 1047. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 1048. 
132. No. CR 05-1145-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 604912 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2007). 
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the jury room shortly after the jury had been discharged.
133
  And in 
Red Star Towing & Transportation Co. v. “Ming Giant,”134 Judge 
Pierre Leval put his law clerk on the stand, in a post-trial hearing, to 
testify about what happened immediately after the jury returned a 
verdict in a case in which counsel for one party was found to have 
provided the jury with information that the judge had ruled inadmiss-
ible: 
My law clerk, Mr. Mark Drooks, testified as follows to 
what occurred after the end of the jury deliberations: On Sat-
urday, February 6, 1982, as soon as the jury left the cour-
troom, Mr. Friedman stood up and said that he wanted to re-
move all of his exhibits from the jury room.  Mr. Leonard 
suggested that the task could be postponed until the follow-
ing Monday but Mr. Friedman insisted it should be done im-
mediately.  Mr. Drooks asked Mr. Bowes not to permit any-
one into the jury room until it was checked.  After the jurors 
left the room, he entered and found PX 337B with other pla-
  
133. Id. at *1.  In the process of ruling against the defendant, on grounds that ―the 
record failed to establish that any deliberating juror was aware of the extrinsic 
information,‖ Judge McNamee was able, rather deftly, to avoid being in the posi-
tion of resolving a credibility battle between his law clerk and one of the jurors:   
In reaching this finding, the Court considered the inconsistent testi-
mony regarding the state of the extrinsic information when it was discov-
ered by the law clerk.  The law clerk testified that the sheet of paper con-
taining the legal terms was sitting outside of the manilla envelope when it 
was discovered while the Alternate testified that he never removed the 
paper from [the] manilla envelope in which it was sealed.  The Court 
need not be concerned with determining how the envelope [became] un-
sealed in light of the testimony of the deliberating jurors.  The Court[ ] is 
only concerned with determining whether any of the jurors who delibe-
rated in this matter were aware of the extraneous information and the af-
firmative testimony of the jurors resolved this question.  Not a single ju-
ror recalled seeing the extraneous information before the evidentiary 
hearing . . . .  Therefore, in light of the testimony of the jurors who parti-
cipated in the deliberations in this matter, the Court finds that a new trial 
is unnecessary because not a single juror participating in the deliberations 
was even aware of the extrinsic information. 
Id. at *3.  Lopez-Martinez clearly points out the discomfort that can ensue when a 
law clerk climbs into the witness box, especially the one in his or her own judge‘s 
courtroom. 
134. 552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
2010 LAW CLERKS OUT OF CONTEXT 99 
cards.  He then asked me to come into the jury room before 
dismissing the lawyers.  He testified that after he showed me 
PX 337B, I brought it into the courtroom and told the law-
yers that I was surprised to find it in the jury room after I had 
so clearly ruled it not in evidence . . . . 
After the above described testimony, Mr. Friedman took 
the stand again, in part to refute the possible inference from 
Mr. Drooks‘ testimony that his impatience to enter the jury 
room resulted from a desire to remove the incriminating ex-
hibit.  He stated that it was his uniform practice to secure all 
exhibits as rapidly as possible after trial so as to insure their 
preservation for appeal.  This position was, however, signifi-
cantly weakened by the testimony of Yangming counsel, Mr. 
Gotimer, that on Saturday evening after the end of the trial, 
Mr. Friedman did not remove the remaining exhibits.  They 
remained in the courtroom over the weekend, and Mr. 
Friedman relied on defense counsel to pick up his exhibits for 
him.  Defense counsel collected all the exhibits and for-
warded plaintiff‘s exhibits to Mr. Friedman under covering 
letter nearly two weeks later.  It appears that Mr. Friedman‘s 
sense of urgency to take possession of his exhibits dimi-
nished substantially after the court‘s discovery of PX 337B. 
I conclude on overwhelming evidence that, through will-
ful misconduct of plaintiff‘s counsel, the jury was sent an ex-
hibit that had been excluded from the evidence because of its 




2.  Procedural Matters 
 
As intimate participants in what goes on backstage in the court-
house, law clerks are privy to all manner of information on proce-
dural matters.  When procedure is civil, all is well, and no law clerk 
needs to spill his or her guts.
136
  But, when things have gone awry, 
  
135. Id. at 384 (citations to the record omitted). 
136. Spill your guts?  Spill the beans?  I suppose that on certain occasions, after 
the proper dietary input, there‘s no meaningful distinction. 
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law clerks have been called to testify about the ordinarily seques-
tered world in which they work. 
In United States v. Reich,
137
 Perry Reich was convicted of ―for-
gery of a judge‘s signature, [and] of corruptly obstructing a judicial 
proceeding.‖138  In support of the second charge,  
Judge Mann‘s law clerk testified that the forged Order 
wasted judicial resources in requiring Judge Mann to issue 
an Order [disavowing the forged Order] and to communicate 
to Judge Korman and the Second Circuit that the forged Or-
der did not come from her, and to discuss the forged order at 
a status conference with the parties.
139
   
The testifying law clerk in Velazquez v. National Presto Industries
140
 
was called to shed light on ―the terms of the ‗settlement understand-
ing‘ that emerged from the two settlement conferences that the court 
had supervised.‖141  In order to determine those terms, the court sup-
plemented its ―own recollection of the conferences‖ by ―hear[ing] 
argument from counsel, elicit[ing] sworn testimony from its own law 
clerk, and consider[ing] affidavits of counsel who were present at the 
conference.‖142  
Also somewhat procedural, but further off the beaten track, is the 
law-clerk testimony in Vietnamese Fishermen’s Association v. 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
143
 in which the plaintiffs sought, among 
other relief, injunctions against ―a variety of alleged unlawful acts of 
violence and intimidation against the plaintiff class . . . .‖144  In that 
case, one of the defendants, who was Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux 
Klan in Texas, moved to disqualify the trial judge ―on the grounds of 
personal bias or prejudice against the defendants.‖145  In his affida-
vit,  
  
137. 420 F. Supp. 2d 75 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2007). 
138. Reich, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 77. 
139. Id. at 84. 
140. 884 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1989). 
141. Id. at 494. 
142. Id. 
143. 518 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1981). 
144. Id. at 1017.   
145. Id. at 1018. 
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Mr. Beam, the Grand Dragon . . . assert[ed] that [the] 
judge‘s impartiality has been demonstrated by instructing 
her law clerk to inquire of counsel for the plaintiffs whether 
they would be intimidated or in any way adversely affected 
in the presentation of their case if Mr. Beam or other mem-
bers of the Ku Klux Klan wore their Klan robes at court 
hearings.
146
   
In her order on the motion to disqualify, Judge Gabrielle McDonald 
wrote: 
At the hearing on this motion, counsel for the defendants 
called as its witness, Charles K. Barber, the law clerk of 
Judge McDonald who was referred to in the Affidavit of De-
fendant Beam.  Mr. Barber testified that although he was not 
the law clerk primarily assigned to the case, he had partici-
pated in a conversation in chambers with the Judge concern-
ing the wearing of Klansmen robes by party‘s witnesses and 
spectators at the scheduled hearing on the preliminary injunc-
tion.  Defendant Beam had worn a Klansman robe to his ini-
tial deposition and the attorneys for plaintiffs sought a pro-
tective order in part because they contended that Mr. Beam 
was wearing a gun under the robe.  Mr. Barber testified that 
the judge was in Biloxi, Mississippi (at a judicial meeting) 
and he was responsible for remaining in contact with the at-
torneys to determine if additional rulings were needed by the 
Court.  During a telephone conversation with Judge McDo-
nald he was advised that the judge was not aware of the 
plaintiffs‘ position with respect to the wearing of Klansmen 
robes and considered that it would be appropriate to hear 
from them before making a final determination.  On the day 
in question when Mr. Barber spoke with Mr. Dees and Ada-
mo, the United States Deputy Marshal had advised Mr. Bar-
ber that the attorneys wanted to speak with him about one of 
the witnesses‘ failure to appear at a scheduled deposition.  
Mr. Barber went to the deposition room in the federal build-
ing to speak with the attorneys about that situation.  As he 
  
146. Id. 
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reached the floor where the depositions were being held, 
counsel for the defendant was leaving, however, Mr. Barber 
spoke with attorneys for the parties about the witness who 
failed to appear.  After this conversation, counsel for defen-
dant left the area and it occurred to Mr. Barber as an after 
thought that he might raise the question of the wearing of 
Klansmen robes in the courtroom.  Mr. Barber raised this is-
sue with counsel for the plaintiffs.  Before counsel for the 
plaintiffs responded, he summoned counsel for the defen-
dants.  The matter was then discussed with all counsel 
present.  Mr. Barber testified that Judge McDonald did not 
instruct him to make an ex parte contact, but instructed him 
to make the inquiry and the matter would be discussed in 
greater detail with the attorneys upon her return.
147
 
To make a long story short, Judge McDonald denied the motion to 
disqualify herself.
148
   
Vietnamese Fishermen’s Association is just one of a number of 
cases in which law clerks have been called upon to provide informa-
tion about communications with parties or attorneys.
149
  For exam-
  
147. Id. at 1018–19. 
148. Id. at 1020.  In another case involving a motion to disqualify a judge, Jewelry 
Repair Enterprises, Inc. v. E & S Associates, Inc., Judge Herbert Hutton‘s law 
clerk and courtroom deputy both testified about a communication between the 
courtroom deputy and counsel for one of the parties.  No. CIV. A. 95-7300, 1996 
WL 311462, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1996).  While Judge McDonald, in Viet-
namese Fishermen’s Ass’n, and Judge Hutton, in Jewelry Repair, both admitted 
the testimony of their law clerks, Judge Bernard Snyder of the Court of Common 
Pleas of Philadelphia, one of the defendants in Lipson v. Snyder took a different 
approach.  CIV. A. No. 85-1118, 1989 WL 79779 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1989).  In the 
state-court action underlying the section 1983 conspiracy claim brought by Her-
bert Lipson, Judge Snyder conducted a recusal hearing at which he ―refused to 
admit the testimony of one of his former law clerks, offered on the issue of his 
alleged bias and partiality.‖  Id. at *3 n.1.  For that conduct, and a litany of other 
malfeasance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court removed Judge Snyder from office.  
Id. at *1. 
149. In fact, most of the procedural matters about which law clerks have been 
called to testify have involved communications between law clerks and others.  
However, on several occasions law clerks have been called to testify on speedy-
trial issues in criminal cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Favaloro, 493 F.2d 623, 
626 (2d Cir. 1974) (Moore, J., dissenting); United States v. Arnett, No. CR-F-95-
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ple, in McCormack v. Schindler (In re Orbitec Corp.),
150
 in a hearing 
in the court below, the trial judge‘s law clerk informed the court, 
albeit not under oath, that he or she had not provided misinformation 
to one of the parties concerning the date on which a decision had 
been rendered.
151
  Unlike the law clerk in McCormack, the law clerk 
in United States v. Wade
152
 did step into the witness box, having 
been called to testify in a post-trial evidentiary hearing about a tele-
phone call he placed to defense counsel in a criminal trial.
153
  The 
defendant‘s counsel claimed he was misled into putting his client on 
the witness stand based upon the law clerk‘s alleged report ―that the 
[trial] judge was not going to instruct the jury on possession, as a 
lesser included offense to the main charge of possession with intent 
to distribute narcotics.‖154  This is what happened at the evidentiary 
hearing: 
Mr. Weiner called Daniel Schneider, the judge‘s law clerk, as 
a witness.  Schneider was asked whether he called Mr. Wein-
er‘s law office leaving a message for him with his secretary 
to the effect that Judge Kinneary will not charge on the lesser 
included offense of possession of heroin and possession of 
cocaine. 
The law clerk‘s response was: 
  
5287 OWW, 2006 WL 2796448, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2006); United States v. 
Altro, 358 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).  Favaloro and Altro involved the 
same case, and law-clerk testimony was necessary, at least in part, because Judge 
George Rosling, the original trial judge, died after he had denied the defendant‘s 
motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, but before he had the opportunity to 
issue findings of fact and rulings of law in support of his decision.  See Altro, 358 
F. Supp. at 1036.  The unavailability of a judge also brought his law clerk to the 
witness stand in Williams v. Horn, in which a reconstruction hearing was held in 
order to determine the reasons why the judge had certified a juvenile as an adult.  
No. CIV. A. 93-3334, 2000 WL 1207165, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2000).   
150. 520 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1975). 
151. Id. at 360.  The party, in turn, had relied upon the law clerk‘s alleged misin-
formation in an attempt to avoid the consequences of failing to file a timely notice 
of appeal.  Id. at 359–60. 
152. 522 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1975).   
153. Id. at 1271.   
154. Id.  
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I don‘t know what she wrote down but I don‘t be-
lieve the message I gave her was what you just said. 
The law clerk was then interrogated as to his telephone 
conversation with Mr. Weiner as follows: 
Q.  Do you recall at that time telling me that the 
Court informed you to inform me that it . . . was not 
going to charge on the lesser included offenses in this 
particular matter? 
A.  No, I didn‘t tell you that. 
Q.  What did you tell me? 
A.  I told you the gist of what I remember telling 
you was that the Judge‘s present thinking or his 
present inclination was not to instruct on the lesser 
included offense of possession.  However, you should 
prepare instructions regarding the lesser included of-
fense stating your position on this point and also any 




The law clerk testified to similar effect on cross-examination, as did 
an Assistant United States Attorney who the law clerk had tele-




155. Id.  
156. Id. at 1271–72.  While an Assistant United States Attorney did take the stand 
in Wade, the judge‘s refusal to permit the defendant to call the prosecutor to the 
stand was at issue in United States v. Robles, 5 F.3d 543 (unpublished table deci-
sion), 1993 WL 379831 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1993).  The court of appeals described 
the defendant/appellant‘s argument: 
Next, appellant claims error in the trial court‘s refusal to permit him 
to call as a witness Assistant United States Attorney Kevin Rooney, the 
prosecutor in the instant trial, who allegedly made statements casting 
doubt on the veracity of Government witness Alma Fuentes who also tes-
tified during the initial trial.  The testimony at issue stems from conversa-
tions allegedly occurring between Rooney and the court‘s Law Clerk, 
Christine Nelson, wherein Rooney allegedly acknowledged that Fuentes 
did not tell the truth in her trial testimony.  Ms. Nelson testified at a hear-
ing during the initial trial that ―Mr. Rooney said to me that Alma Fuentes 
had not been truthful on the stand.‖  While conceding that there was some 
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ing to the appellate court, the judge conducting the post-trial hearing 
―credited the testimony of the law clerk and the Assistant United 
States Attorney, rather than the testimony of [defense counsel] Mr. 
Weiner, as he was privileged to do.‖157  In other words, defense 
counsel was unable to pin the tail on the law clerk.  Whether Mr. 
Weiner‘s client was ever able to pin the tail on his attorney, by 
means of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, is a tale for 
another donkey to tell.   
Remaining within the realm of criminal proceedings, U.S. Dis-
trict Judge John Sirica‘s law clerk once found himself in the witness 
box at a sentencing hearing.  As reported by the court of appeals: 
A few moments later, the sentencing hearing flew off on 
a revealing tangent when the trial judge read a letter submit-
ted by the appellant.  The letter, from his attorney, referred to 
a visit the lawyer had made to the judge‘s law clerk.  In it he 
reported that in the clerk‘s opinion ‗there was only one way 
to get a light sentence from Judge [Sirica] and that was to 
confess that you did the robbery, to apologize four or five 
times and to say that you were willing to turn over a new 
leaf.‘  The trial judge then called his clerk to the witness 
stand and interrogated him concerning his conversation with 
the attorney.  The clerk affirmed that the letter fairly reflected 
the substance of his comments to the lawyer.  He stated, ‗It 
has always been my opinion that you view sentencing diffe-
rently when someone admits guilt rather than maintaining in-
nocence.‘  He added, however, ‗This has nothing to do with 
private conversations we have had in chambers.  It is from 
things I have heard while sitting in that seat during sentenc-
ing hearings.‘ 
  
dispute as to whether Rooney was referring to Fuentes‘ entire testimony 
or just that part concerning when she received her immunity, appellant 
asserts that it is ―undisputed‖ that Rooney ―felt at least some portion of 
Alma Fuentes‘ testimony was untruthful.‖  This testimony, appellant ar-
gues, would have permitted the impeachment of Alma Fuentes and con-
stituted evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Id. at *4.  The court of appeals did not agree.  Id. at *5. 
157. Wade, 522 F.2d at 1272. 
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The judge himself then commented upon his reactions to 
defendants found guilty by the jury who continued to assert 
their innocence at allocution.  He went on, ‗I hope sometime 
I hear some defendant say, ‗Judge, I am sorry, I am sorry for 
what I did.‘  That is what I have in mind.‘158 
The defendant‘s conviction was affirmed, but the case was remanded 
for resentencing.
159
   
In United States v. Parker,
160
 the trial judge was faced with the 
defendant‘s motion for a new trial based upon ―[a]n affidavit . . . 
alleging that the affiant had observed what she said indicated that 
United States marshals and a law clerk had made improper contact 
with the jurors.‖161  In response, the trial judge ―interrogated the 
United States marshals and his law clerk.‖162  Those interrogations 
were recorded, but conducted in camera.
163
  In response to the de-
fendant/appellant‘s objection that ―the defense attorney was not 
present at the in camera examination of the jury foreman, law clerk 
and marshal,‖164 the court of appeals ruled: ―While the better prac-
tice would have been to have the attorneys present, appellant can 
show no harm or prejudice arising from the court‘s actions.  At most, 
the exclusion of counsel from the in camera investigation is harmless 
error.‖165 
I conclude this section with Shiwlochan v. Portuondo,
166
 a real 
jaw dropper, and the kind of case that inspired me to write this ar-
ticle in the first place.  Shiwlochan involved a habeas corpus petition 
that was granted in part based upon ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.
167
  Judge David Trager held an evidentiary hearing, a portion of 
which he described as follows: 
  
158. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
159. Id. at 279. 
160. 549 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1977). 




165. Id. (citations omitted). 
166. 345 F. Supp. 2d 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
167. Id. at 270. 
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Peter Dunne, who served as the principal law clerk to 
Judge John Leahy from August, 1986 to December, 1996, al-
so testified on behalf of respondent.  His duties as law clerk 
included conferencing and negotiating dispositions in all cas-
es pending before Judge Leahy, writing all of the judge‘s de-
cisions and drafting jury instructions.  Dunne testified that 
Judge Leahy became involved with disposing of a case only 
after Dunne reached an agreement with the parties.  He also 
claimed that while Judge Leahy ordinarily did not offer a par-
ticular sentence to a defendant, the judge had a ―policy not to 
take any disposition once jury selection began.‖ 
Although Dunne had no recollection of the facts of peti-
tioner‘s case, he testified he made it a habit to be with the 
judge during trials because ―Judge Leahy needed watching.  I 
needed to make sure that everything he did was right.‖168 
I am hard pressed to improve on the marginal note I made when I 
first discovered this case: ―Wow.‖ 
 
3.  Sanctions 
 
As front-row spectators of the rich pageant that is the American 
judicial system, law clerks are well positioned to get an eyeful of the 
good, the bad, and the ugly of courtroom practice.
169
  When the bad 
gets ugly, judges are sometimes compelled to target the offending 
attorney with sanctions, and, when a law clerk gets caught up in the 
  
168. Id. at 256 (citations to the record omitted). 
169. As Judge Edward Weinfeld explained in an opinion finding Attorney Stanley 
Cohen guilty of criminal contempt in a trial before Judge Dudley Bonsal:  
In addition to the acts or statements contained in the trial transcript, the 
government, to support the charge, relied upon the testimony of one of 
Judge Bonsal‘s law clerks, who was present throughout the entire trial 
and who described the respondent‘s expressions, manner of speaking, 
bearing and attitude with reference to each cited particular.  
In re Cohen, 370 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (footnotes omitted).  Judge 
Weinfeld elaborated: ―In noting respondent‘s manner of speech, bearing and atti-
tude, the Court accepts the testimony of Judge Bonsal‘s clerk, and the findings of 
respondent‘s manner during such incidents are based thereon.‖  Id. at 1171 n.27.  
Among other things, the law clerk testified that, at one sidebar conference, ―res-
pondent raised his voice so that the jury could hear.‖  Id. at 1171.  
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In Nabkey v. Hoffius,
171
 Judge David McKeague held a pro se li-
tigant in contempt for violating his orders to return juror question-
naires and not to contact members of the jury or venire.
172
  At the 
contempt hearing, Judge McKeague received testimony from, and 
directly examined, several deputy clerks, a case manager, and his 
law clerk.
173
  At a show-cause hearing in Jimenez v. Coca-Cola 
Co.,
174
 after which Judge Roslyn Silver imposed a variety of limita-
tions on plaintiff Joe Jimenez‘s access to the courthouse, the judge 
took testimony from one of her law clerks: 
Finally, a law clerk for this Court testified that he re-
ceived telephone calls from Mr. Jimenez in early 2001.  Mr. 
Jimenez inquired about the status of his case and accused the 
Court and the arbitrator handling the union matter of conspir-
ing with his attorney and Defendant Coca-Cola.  The law 
clerk also testified that after the Court granted Defendant‘s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Jimenez telephoned 
again in September 2001, indicating his intention to appeal 
and stating that he would ―then take care of all the bad people 
afterwards.‖175  
  
170. Getting the law clerk into the witness box can be essential, at least according 
to some jurists.  See Ahmed v. Reiss Steamship Co. (In re Jaques), 761 F.2d 302, 
309 (6th Cir. 1985) (Hillman, J., dissenting) (explaining, in dissent from affir-
mance of trial court‘s contempt sanctions: ―The judge‘s ‗findings‘ were based on 
ex parte accounts related to her by her law clerk and the district court in Baltimore.  
There can be no question she was incompetent as a witness to render such testi-
mony.‖) (citing FED. R. EVID. 602, 605, 802).  While the law clerk did not testify 
at the contempt hearing, lucky spectators had the pleasure of hearing Attorney 
Jaques justify a previous failure to appear by explaining to Judge Ann Aldridge 
―that he ‗had the screaming itches in the crotch . . . [and] wasn‘t here because [he] 
would have been scratching [his] testicles constantly if [he] had been here.‘‖  Id. at 
305.  As Jerry Lee Lewis might say, ―Goodness, gracious . . . .‖ 
171. 827 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Mich. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Nabkey v. 61st Dist. 
Court, 79 F.3d 1148 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). 
172. Nabkey, 827 F. Supp. at 457. 
173. Id. at 453. 
174. No. 99-1631-PHX-ROS, 2001 WL 1654802, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2001). 
175. Id. at *2, *4 (citation omitted). 
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Now there‘s a procedural posture they don‘t train you for in law 
school.   
An entirely different set of circumstances, equally uncovered in 
most law-school curriculua, are those that came to pass in United 
States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
176
 in which the Fifth 
Circuit reversed a conviction for criminal contempt based on CBS‘s 
violation of ―district court orders banning the publication of sketches 
of courtroom scenes.‖177  At the show-cause hearing on the contempt 
citation, the prosecution called the judge‘s law clerk because the 
court orders that CBS was charged with violating ―were delivered 
orally in the judge‘s chambers‖ and without a court reporter 
present.
178
  As the court of appeals explained in reversing the con-
tempt conviction: 
We are faced with the unusual setting of a judge trying a 
case in which he was a principal actor in the factual issues to 
be determined.  Essential to the proof of the prosecution‘s 
case were acts committed by the judge himself, i.e. the ver-
bal, unrecorded orders.  The judge had to determine whether 
what he said was said was really said.  He obviously could 
not be a witness and a judge in the same proceeding.  To 
prove what the judge must have thought he already knew, his 
secretary, his law clerk and a local reporter were called as 
prosecution witnesses. 
. . . . 
The recondite niceties of contempt law coupled with the 
strange milieu of a judge passing on the clarity of his own 
orders, which had to be substantiated largely by his own legal 
staff, should make us particularly sensitive to the demands of 
justice, and more particularly, to the appearance of justice.  
The guarantee to the defendant of a totally fair and impartial 
tribunal, and the protection of the integrity and dignity of the 
  
176. 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974). 
177. Id. at 108, 110. 
178. Id. at 108.  
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judicial process from any hint or appearance of bias is the 
palladium of our judicial system.
179
 
Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
180
 is another case 
in which the court of appeals sided with an alleged contemnor rather 
than the trial judge, notwithstanding the testimony of the judge‘s law 
clerk.
181
  In that case, Judge Kevin Duffy spent much of the trial 
sparring with Attorney Joseph Smukler, an out-of-town lawyer.
182
  
Midway through trial, the judge accused Attorney Smukler of coach-
ing his witnesses: 
[A]fter chiding Smukler for having ―poorly, if ever, pre-
pared,‖ the court said, ―[O]thers saw you motioning to the 
witnesses, the four witnesses you had [meaning the fellow 
conductors] during cross-examination, indicating what the 
answer should be.‖  Smukler denied this as ―absolutely un-
true.‖  The judge‘s law clerk was then called as a witness and 
said that Smukler motioned either in an affirmative or nega-
tive way during the cross-examinations.
183
 
On the basis of other conduct, Judge Duffy found Attorney Smukler 
in contempt
184
 but subsequently vacated that finding.
185
  However, 
four days into the trial, Judge Duffy denied Attorney Smuckler‘s 
late-filed motion request for admission pro hac vice.
186
  In the end, 
the court of appeals vacated and remanded, holding that ―the trial 
judge‘s attitude, his treatment of Smukler, and the abrupt change of 
counsel midway through trial sufficiently prejudiced the plaintiff so 
as to require a new trial.‖187 
Finally, while most of the law clerks mentioned in this section 
were called upon to testify about the conduct of parties or counsel 
  
179. Id. at 109 (citing Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Grizzell v. 
Wainwright, 481 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
180. 81 F.3d 265, 266–67 (2d Cir. 1996). 
181. Id. at 275. 
182. See id. at 266–71. 
183. Id. at 270. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 271. 
186. Santa Maria, 81 F.3d at 274. 
187. Id. at 266–67. 
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who appeared before their judges, at least one law clerk has had to 
testify about her own conduct at a show-cause hearing.  In Eisenberg 
v. University of New Mexico:
188
  
Ms. Torres, the attorney representing the plaintiff in the 
underlying case, filed a motion for [a] new trial following a 
jury verdict against her client.  In her motion, she alleged that 
Judge Edwin L. Mechem‘s law clerk had engaged in prejudi-
cial ex parte conduct in regard to sending requested exhibits 
to the jury during deliberations.  Ms. Torres attached her own 
affidavit to the motion, further alleging that during jury in-
struction discussions between respective counsel and the law 
clerk in the judge‘s conference room, this same law clerk in-
dicated that she was being represented by a member of de-
fense counsel‘s law firm.  The motion for new trial was de-
nied, and no appeal was taken.  Judge Mechem subsequently 
issued an order to show cause as to why Ms. Torres should 
not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for failure to conduct an 
adequate inquiry into the truth and accuracy of her statement 
regarding the law clerk‘s involvement with defense counsel‘s 
law firm.  After issuing the order, Judge Mechem recused 
himself from the show cause proceedings, and Judge James 
Parker was assigned to hear the case.
189
 
Attorney Torres subsequently filed a second affidavit in which she 
―further alleged that during a court recess, the law clerk had made a 
second remark to the effect that she was being represented by a 
member of defense counsel‘s law firm.‖190  At the show-cause hear-
ing, ―Judge Parker heard testimony from Ms. Torres, the law clerk, 
both defense counsel, the court reporter, and Ms. Torres‘s attor-
ney.‖191  Finding that the remarks Ms. Torres attributed to the law 
clerk had not been made, Judge Parker imposed Rule 11 sanctions on 
  
188. 936 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1991). 
189. Id. at 1132–33. 
190. Id. at 1133. 
191. Id. 
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Ms. Torres.
192
  The court of appeals, while not completely on board 
with Judge Parker‘s decision, affirmed.193 
Then there is the one that got away, an imposition of sanctions 
that was reversed on appeal largely because the law clerk of the 
judge who imposed the sanctions did not testify.  In LaSalle Nation-
al Bank v. First Connecticut Holding Group, L.L.C. XXIII,
194
 Judge 
Faith Hochberg sanctioned two attorneys, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
for misrepresentations allegedly made to the judge‘s law clerk in two 
telephone conversations that had the effect of unreasonably multiply-
ing the proceedings.
195
  The rub was that while the attorneys testified 




The law clerk‘s version of events . . . was never placed on the 
record, and Rosen‘s counsel was not able to cross examine 
her regarding any inconsistencies with Rosen‘s account, or 
explore whether differing recollections merely resulted from 
an innocent misunderstanding.  Consequently, the only sworn 
testimony regarding the communications between the law 
clerk and Rosen came from Rosen.  Nevertheless, the court 
rejected Rosen‘s testimony outright.  The court did so by tak-
ing ―judicial notice‖ that Rosen had used the term ―defense 
counsel‖ rather than ―borrower‘s counsel‖ in his communica-
tions with the law clerk.
197
 
The court of appeals took issue with trial court‘s fact finding: 
The court took judicial notice of those two conversations 
even though the court did not hear any part of the disputed 
conversations and had no way of knowing what was said 
other than asking the law clerk; the only participant other 
than Rosen.  We must, therefore, conclude that the judge‘s 
certainty as to the substance of Rosen‘s communications with 
her chambers was based on private discussions she had with 
  
192. Id. 
193. Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1137. 
194. 287 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2002). 
195. Id. at 288, 292. 
196. Id. at 287. 
197. Id. 
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her law clerk—discussions that neither Rosen nor his attor-
ney were privy to or informed of. 
There is absolutely no way that the contents of Rosen‘s 
disputed conversations with the judge‘s law clerk even re-
motely satisfies the requirements for judicial notice in [Fed-
eral] Rule [of Evidence] 201(b).  The contents of those con-
versations are certainly not a matter of common knowledge, 
nor are they easily provable from a source whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.  See[,] e.g.[,] Oran v. Staf-
ford, 226 F.3d 275, 289 (3d Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice 
of the contents of properly authenticated public disclosure 
documents filed with the SEC); Policemen’s Benevolent 
Ass’n v. Washington Township, 850 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 
1988) (taking judicial notice of Township‘s police force 
regulations); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528 
F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1976) (upholding judicial notice of de-
fendant‘s prior conviction). 
We certainly understand that a judge would be most re-
luctant to allow his/her law clerk to be called to the witness 
stand and questioned under oath under the circumstances 
here.  Moreover, we are not unsympathetic to the dilemma 
this created for the judge.  However, that dilemma does not 
justify short circuiting the fact finding process by a mantra-
like reliance on ―judicial notice.‖  This is especially true in 
light of the severe consequences that flowed from the court‘s 
resolution of the factual dispute about the conversations with 
the law clerk.  The court‘s conclusion regarding those con-
versations was a key factor in finding bad faith.  Yet, Rosen 
was not able to confront the only witness who could possibly 
corroborate or dispute his version of the conversations.  
Thus, not only was the court‘s resort to ―judicial notice‖ im-
proper, it also denied Rosen ―a meaningful opportunity to be 





198. Id. at 290–91 (footnote omitted). 
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So, while law clerks are often regarded as their judges‘ right 
hands,
199
 law clerks and judges appear not to be conjoined in such a 
way that a law clerk‘s knowledge is properly subject to judicial no-
tice.  The court of appeals did recognize that the attorneys who were 
sanctioned could have called the law clerk themselves but also noted 
the problems posed by such an approach: 
Of course, Marshall could have called the law clerk to the 
stand on behalf of Rosen at the Show Cause hearing.  How-
ever, we also recognize that an attorney would be reluctant 
(to say the least) to call a law clerk to the witness stand to 
testify before the very judge the clerk was clerking for under 
circumstances that might require a fairly aggressive cross ex-
amination in front of the ―clerk‘s judge.‖  Under these cir-
cumstances, it is hardly appropriate, practical, or fair to re-




Attorneys are not the only courtroom denizens who are subject to 
sanctions. Judges, too, have standards to which they must adhere, 
and, when they fail to do so, or appear to fail, law-clerk testimony 
sometimes follows.  For example, in United States v. Campbell,
201
 
Judge Robert Campbell of the District of Columbia Superior Court 
was convicted of bribery, and Judge Campbell‘s law clerk testified, 
presumably for the defense, that he or she had never seen the judge 
in the presence of one of the other defendants from whom the judge 
had been accused of taking bribes.
202
  In another case involving judi-
  
199. See, e.g., Dedication Ceremony for the Conrad B. Duberstein Bankruptcy 
Courthouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 20 (2005) (―[W]here would I have 
been without . . . my other right-hand-man, my law clerk, David Capucilli.‖); Alex 
S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 373, 391 n. 89 (1991) (―Unlike law clerks, who have special rela-
tionships with individual judges, ordinarily acting as a ‗right-hand person‘ for the 
judge—vigorously debating issues with the judge and helping the judge write opi-
nions—central staff attorneys have more institutional responsibilities.‖) (citation 
omitted). 
200. Id. at 291 n.7. 
201. 702 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
202. Id. at 287. 
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cial misconduct,
203
 the Eleventh Circuit denied motions to quash 





4.  Litigant Competency 
 
Law clerks have also been called to testify about the competence 
of the parties appearing before their judges.  In United States v. Tes-
fa,
205
 Judge William Ditter described such a situation, in the context 
of a criminal defendant‘s challenge to his conviction based on, 
among other things, a claim that ―he was denied due process because 
the court improperly found that he was competent to stand trial.‖206  
In the words of Judge Ditter: 
On November 22, 1974, the day after the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty, the court commenced a posttrial competen-
cy hearing.  At the outset, I stated for the record certain ob-
servations regarding the defendant‘s behavior of which I had 
made notes throughout the course of the trial.  I thereupon 
called to the witness stand, in succession, one of my law 
clerks and my courtroom deputy, who had, at my instruction 
recorded their observations of the defendant‘s conduct in the 
courtroom both when court was and was not in session.  The 
  
203. See Williams v. Mercer (In re Certain Complaints), 783 F.2d 1488, 1491 
(11th Cir. 1986).  The charges against Judge Alcee Hastings included allegations 
that he 
had allowed ex parte contacts between his law clerk and counsel in pend-
ing cases concerning substantive issues in those cases and concerning the 
content of orders and opinions not yet entered, and had ―completely abdi-
cated and delegated‖ his judicial decision-making authority to his law 
clerk. 
Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 96 n.12 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
204. Williams, 783 F.2d at 1524.  
205. 404 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Green, 
544 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1976).  
206. Tesfa, 404 F. Supp. at 1260. 
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three of us made ourselves available for questioning by both 
defense counsel and the assistant United States attorney.
207
 
In United States v. Green,
208
 the Tesfa appeal, the court of appeals 
described Judge Ditter‘s hearing in somewhat more detail: 
At intervals, throughout the course of the trial, it was re-
ported to the court that the defendant was not communicating 
with defense counsel or assisting in the presentation of his 
defense.  However, it was also reported to the court that 
when out of the view of the prosecutor, his counsel, the jury 
and the trial judge, the defendant‘s behavior was substantial-
ly different from the appearances of mental impairment he 
gave in the presence of the above-listed persons.  On No-
vember 22, 1974, at a post-trial competency hearing, the trial 
judge revealed that from October 30 he had maintained care-
ful notes of the defendant‘s behavior in the court room and 
had directed his law clerks to observe and record the defen-
dant‘s actions when the defendant was outside of his obser-
vation.  Each law clerk testified to observations consistent 
with an affected pose of mental impairment at times, includ-
ing staring into space, looking at his fingers, holding them up 
and moving them around, laughing at inappropriate times, 
staring at people, etc.  However, when the above-listed per-
sons were not present, ―Mr. Tesfa perked up and went to talk 
to his mother and talked to the marshals, got a cigarette from 
them and acted in a rather normal manner, seemed to easily 
communicate with them . . . and when the attorneys and Your 
Honor came back in he resumed his staring during the jury 
  
207. Id. at 1264 (footnote omitted).  After describing the hearing, Judge Ditter 
took pains to distinguish his case from Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted, 493 F.2d 1401 
(3d Cir. 1974) (unpublished table decision), in which the court of appeals  
held that supplementation of the record before a district court by affida-
vits of the trial judge‘s law clerks constituted error where that fact was 
not disclosed to counsel for the losing party and the court handed down 
its opinion before counsel had an opportunity to see the affidavits or 
cross-examine the affiants.  
Tesfa, 404 F. Supp. at 1264 n.5. 
208. 544 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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selection.‖  Also, the defendant appeared to pay close atten-
tion to the expert testimony presented by both sides.
209
 
The court of appeals endorsed Judge Ditter‘s approach, noting that 
―[w]e have concluded that under the circumstances of the present 
case, it was not reversible error for the trial judge . . . to instruct his 
law clerks to monitor the defendant‘s behavior‖210 and explaining 
that ―we think that the trial judge‘s actions in recording the defen-
dant‘s actions and instructing his law clerks to do so comports with 
[the] standards outlined in United States v. Liddy.‖211   
 
5.  Future Dangerousness 
 
United States v. Johnson
212
 also involved law-clerk testimony 
about a defendant‘s out-of-court demeanor, but in a slightly different 
context.
213
  In Johnson, Judge Mark Bennett allowed his former law 
clerk to testify during the penalty phase of Angela Johnson‘s murder 
trial.
214
  In a motion for post-judgment relief, Johnson argued 
that the court erred in allowing its former law clerk to testify 
to statements she purportedly overheard Johnson make in the 
law clerk‘s presence when the court itself was a witness to 
Johnson‘s subsequent letter of apology that had been mis-
placed or lost and where the court‘s remedy denied Johnson 
the opportunity to take the sting out of the evidence and 
created a false impression for the jury.
215
  
Johnson made the statement at issue in the hallway outside the cour-
troom in which Judge Bennett had sentenced another defendant.
216
  
In the presence of Judge Bennett‘s law clerk, Johnson made com-
ments that the law clerk believed to contain threats against the 
  
209. Id. at 143–44 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
210. Id. at 146. 
211. Id. (citing United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
212. 403 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Iowa 2005), aff’d and remanded, 495 F.3d 951 
(8th Cir. 2007). 
213. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 852–53. 
214. Id. at 852. 
215. Id. at 852–53. 
216. Id. at 853. 
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judge.
217
  Judge Bennett allowed his law clerk to testify about those 
comments at the penalty phase of Johnson‘s trial, with two limita-
tions: ―the court did not allow the government to elicit or allow the 
former clerk to testify that she was a ‗law clerk‘ under the under-
signed‘s direct supervision,‖218 and ―to avoid potential prejudice, the 
court barred the government from eliciting testimony that the former 
clerk believed that Johnson‘s threats had been directed at the under-
signed.‖219  In response to Johnson‘s motion for post-judgment re-
lief, Judge Bennett ruled ―that the testimony of the former clerk, as 
limited, was relevant to the issue of Johnson‘s future dangerousness, 
because it related to threats by Johnson to law enforcement officers 
and government officials.‖220  The testimony was not unfairly pre-
judicial, Judge Bennett ruled, because of the two limitations he 
placed on it, precluding the former clerk from indicating her close 
employment relationship with him and from giving her opinion of 
the character of Johnson‘s comments.221  Accordingly, Judge Ben-
nett denied Johnson‘s request for relief as it related to the admission 
of the former law clerk‘s testimony.222 
 
III.  LAW-CLERK LITIGANTS 
 
In Part II, I discussed cases in which law clerks have made the 
move from the law clerk‘s desk to the witness box.  This Part is de-
voted to cases in which law clerks have made a similarly short but 
significant trip, from chambers to the courthouse intake window.  
That is, I discuss law-clerk litigants.   
Before doing so, I offer two caveats.  First, because this article is 
targeted toward the ―clerkigentsia,‖223 I have chosen to exclude cases 




219. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 853. 
220. Id. at 854 (citing Moore v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
221. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
222. Id. 
223. See Potter, Law Clerks Gone Wild, supra note 1, at 175 n.7 (―The clerkigent-
sia consists of former law clerks, current law clerks, and those aspiring to be law 
clerks.‖). 
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duties as a law clerk are tangential to the issue being litigated.
224
  
Second, my discussion is limited to law clerks as plaintiffs; while 
dozens and dozens of law clerks have been named as defendants on 
account of actions they took as law clerks, they tend to remain de-
fendants relatively briefly, owing to the extension of the doctrine of 
judicial immunity to law clerks,
225
 which allows a law clerk named 
as a defendant to move quite speedily from ―OMG‖ to ―LOL.‖ 
Of course, judicial immunity for law clerks goes only so far.  It 
does not provide protection for conduct outside the friendly confines 
  
224. See, e.g., United States v. Schay, 746 F. Supp. 877, 877 (E.D. Ark. 1990), 
rev’d sub nom. White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1992) (in which the United 
States sued landlord under Fair Housing Act for refusing to rent house to black 
lawyer who was serving as law clerk to federal judge); Doe v. United Servs. Life 
Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (allowing plaintiff suing life 
insurance company to vindicate the rights of homosexuals to do so under a pseu-
donym, but rejecting plaintiff‘s argument that anonymity was necessary because of 
―the effect [the] case might have on his status as a law clerk to a federal judge‖); 
Black v. Sullivan, 561 F. Supp. 1050, 1072 (D. Me. 1983) (noting that application 
for law-clerk position in Maine established domiciliary intent necessary to qualify 
as state resident for purposes of qualifying for in-state tuition rate); Dobson v. 
Camden, 502 F. Supp. 679, 679 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (referring to suit brought by law 
clerks charging City of Houston, and others, with race and sex discrimination); 
Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass‘n, 620 P.2d 640, 646 (Alaska 1980) (holding that state 
rule barring law clerk in Texas from taking Alaska bar exam until she had resided 
in Alaska for thirty days violated privileges and immunities clause of federal con-
stitution). 
225. See Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365 (2d Cir. 2009) (―In addition, 
Muldoon is entitled to absolute immunity as a law clerk to a state court judge be-
cause he was acting in a judicial capacity.‖) (citing Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 
40 (2d Cir. 1988)); cf. Reddy v. O‘Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 132 (D.D.C. 
2007) (explaining that principles of ―supervisory responsibility‖ precluded district 
court from issuing orders compelling Supreme Court law clerks to take particular 
actions) (citing Marin v. Suter (In re Marin), 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
Even though the law clerk in Fixel v. United States enjoyed immunity, Judge 
Howard McKibben addressed the merits of Dennis Fixel‘s complaint anyway, 
which allowed him to characterize Fixel‘s claims against a pro se law clerk as 
frivolous as a matter of law.  737 F. Supp. 593, 595, 598 (D. Nev. 1990).  And, in 
DeFerro v. Coco, Judge Marvin Katz recognized that Judge Nicholas Cipriani‘s 
law clerk, Dennis O‘Connell, was ―entitled to absolute immunity under the quasi-
judicial immunity doctrine‖ but based his decision on O‘Connell‘s ―uncontro-
verted affidavit, [in which he testified that] he acted pursuant to Judge Cipriani‘s 
directive and instructions.‖  719 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
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of chambers.
226
  Nor does judicial immunity outlive the term of a 
clerkship.  In an opinion in a criminal case, Judge Richard Clifton 
began with what must be the most mortifying words ever written 
about a former law clerk: ―This case presents the disappointing story 
of a promising federal appellate law clerk gone bad.‖227  According 
to Judge Clifton, ―Robert Gordon, a graduate of Stanford Law 
School and a former law clerk for one of our colleagues, a judge on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, embezzled mil-
lions of dollars in cash and stock from his employer, Cisco Sys-
tems.‖228  In United States v. Jefferson,229 Judge Thomas Ellis de-
scribed defendant William Jefferson in the following way: 
Defendant is the currently sitting member of the United 
States House of Representatives representing Louisiana‘s 2nd 
Congressional District, an office he has held since 1991.  He 
is a graduate of Harvard Law School and a former law clerk 
for the late United States District Judge Alvin B. Rubin.  
Prior to his election to Congress he was a member of the 
Louisiana state senate, and following his election to Congress 
he earned a graduate law degree in tax law from the George-
town University Law Center.
230
 
Jefferson was convicted of eleven of the sixteen counts in the in-
dictment against him.
231
  The former law clerk in In re Violation of 
Rule 50
232
 did not go nearly as bad as Robert Gordon or William 
Jefferson, but, nonetheless, he was given a ―strong admonishment‖ 
by the Federal Circuit after he prepared and filed a brief in a case 
that was pending before that court during his tenure as a law clerk 
  
226. See, e.g., United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting 
defendant was charged with evading taxes on, among other things, income earned 
by from ―a part-time job as a law clerk to a Philadelphia judge‖). 
227. United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2004). 
228. Id. at 1048.  
229. 562 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 546 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (U.S. 2009).  
230. Jefferson, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 709. 
231. See Richard Simon, Congressman Who Had Cash in Freezer Is Convicted of 
11 Criminal Counts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/06/nation/na-jefferson6. 
232. 78 F.3d 574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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there.
233
  Whether it is due to the prescience of judges who hire law 
clerks, or the moral clarity of those who serve as law clerks, the law-
clerk field appears to have been infested by only a very few bad 
seeds; Gordon, Jefferson, and Violation of Rule 50 are the only cases 
of their kind I was able to find.
234
 
Turning then, from law clerks in the cross-hairs, as defendants, 
to law clerks driving the litigation train, as plaintiffs, I examine three 
categories of cases: those in which law clerks have litigated in an 
attempt to make something good happen, those in which they have 
litigated in an attempt to keep something bad from happening, and 
those in which they have sought to recover after something bad has 
already happened to them. 
In Metsch v. United States,
235
 Lawrence Metsch became a hero to 
law clerks everywhere when he sued for, and won, a retroactive sala-
  
233. Id. at 576. 
234. There may be a fourth law clerk gone bad in Henderson v. Johnson, but I 
cannot be sure.  In that case, an inmate incarcerated on state criminal charges, and 
who was seeking a writ of habeas corpus, ―allege[d] that [Joseph] Goodson, a 
fellow inmate who represented that he was a lawyer and a former law clerk to a 
United States District Judge, assisted him in preparing and filing his petition.‖  1 
F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (N.D. Tex. 1998).  The opinion does not indicate whether 
Goodson really was a former law clerk, but it does establish that Goodson mal-
practiced his ―client,‖ Henderson: 
Henderson contends that Goodson agreed to prepare the petition and in-
formed him that he filed it on August 26, 1996.  When Henderson be-
came concerned that he had not received any pleadings in his case, he 
talked with Goodson, who urged him not to contact the court because of 
the sensitive nature of the proceedings and the potential that he would 
―screw everything up.‖  Henderson finally wrote to the court clerk on Ju-
ly 23, 1997, almost 11 months after Goodson had supposedly filed the pe-
tition.  When the clerk informed Henderson that no petition had been 
filed, he confronted Goodson, who denied that he had not filed the peti-
tion and produced a copy of a petition that appeared to bear a legitimate 
file stamp from this court.  Henderson in turn asked the clerk‘s office 
whether a mistake had occurred, and learned that the seal was not the dis-
trict clerk‘s and that no petition had been filed. Henderson concluded that 
Goodson had created the stamp to hide the truth. 
Id.  So, while Goodson may or may not have been a law clerk gone bad, he was 
most certainly a bad law clerk.  Sadly for Henderson, the court ruled that Good-
son‘s malpractice did not constitute an ―extraordinary circumstance‖ sufficient to 
excuse the late filing of Henderson‘s habeas petition.  Id. 
235. 381 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
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ry increase.
236
  Factually, Metsch‘s boss, United States Circuit Judge 
Bryan Simpson, attempted to promote Metsch from the position of 
―Associate Law Clerk‖ to that of ―Senior Law Clerk,‖ but the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts rejected 
Judge Simpson‘s request to reclassify Metsch, citing a wage and 
price freeze mandated by an Executive Order.
237
  In the district 
court, Judge William Mehrtens ruled that the Administrative Office 




In contrast with Metsch, who successfully sued to bring about a 
happy ending, Antonio Mareno, the law-clerk plaintiff in Mareno v. 
Re
239
 brought suit in an attempt to avoid the consequences of a very 
unhappy ending, his judge‘s death.240  Mareno worked for Judge 
Scovel Richardson of the United States Customs Court for more than 
twenty years, up until the judge died.
241
  Shortly after Judge Rich-
ardson‘s passing, Chief Judge Edward Re informed Mareno that his 
employment would terminate on the six-month anniversary of Judge 
Richardson‘s death.242  Mareno sued Chief Judge Re, asserting con-
stitutional liberty and property interests in his continued employ-
ment.
243
  District Judge Charles Haight was not persuaded, ruling 
that the language of the statute governing the employment of law 
clerks was ―inimical to the concept of a property interest in employ-
ment by the court.‖244  The plaintiff law clerk in Silvestri v. Barbie-
  
236. Id. at 487. 
237. Id. at 485–86.  In fact, the Director rejected Judge Simpson‘s request to rec-
lassify Metsch, ―along with fifty-one other requests for promotions or reclassifica-
tions within the category of ‗law clerk‘ and ‗secretary‘ during the period of the 
[wage] freeze.‖  Id. at 485. 
238. Id. at 487.  
239. 568 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).   
240. Mareno, 568 F. Supp. at 17. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 20. 
243. Id. at 17. 
244. Id. at 20; see also Potter v. Mosley, 211 F.3d 1274, 1274 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision) (ruling that a state-court law clerk ―was an at-will 
employee and, therefore . . . had no constitutionally protected interest in keeping 
his job‖ and ―had no constitutionally protected right to obtain a new appointment a 
number of months after he had been terminated‖). 
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ri
245
 was equally unsuccessful in his efforts to enjoin his termina-
tion.
246
  In Silvestri, a state-court law clerk ―became a candidate for 
the office of School Director in a school district in Allegheny Coun-
ty and received the nominations of both parties.‖247  Subsequently, 
he was notified of directives sent by the defendant Alexander 
F. Barbieri, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, to the 
Judges and Justices-of-the-Peace in Pennsylvania calling 
their attention to the regulations of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, which prohibit employees of the Judiciary in 
the State of Pennsylvania from engaging in political activities 
[and then he] was threatened with discharge unless he with-
drew from the candidacy for office.
248
 
Rather than withdrawing, Silvestri filed suit in federal court seeking 
―injunctive relief against his threatened discharge.‖249  As it turns 
out, he sought similar relief in the state courts of Pennsylvania nearly 
simultaneously, and, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled 
against him while his federal-court action was pending, the federal 
court concluded its consideration by denying relief on grounds of res 
judicata and abstention.
250
  The school district‘s gain was the Court 
of Common Pleas‘ loss. 
The plaintiff in Sheppard v. Beerman
251
 was not a law clerk, but, 
rather, a former law clerk.
252
  Specifically, ―Brian Sheppard served 
as a law clerk to New York State Supreme Court Justice Leon Beer-
man from 1986 until he was fired on December 11, 1990.‖253  The 
facts of the case are remarkable: 
[O]n December 6, 1990, Sheppard and Judge Beerman had 
conferred on the Judge‘s contemplated action on a speedy 
trial motion in People v. Mason & Williams, a pending mur-
  
245. 434 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
246. Id. at 1202. 
247. Id. at 1201.  
248. Id.  
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 1202. 
251. 317 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Sheppard III]. 
252. Id. at 352. 
253. Id. at 353.  
124 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 1 
der case.  Judge Beerman asked Sheppard to draft a decision 
that would set the case for trial after the coming Christmas 
holiday season.  Sheppard, however, believed that such a dis-
position would be unfairly prejudicial to Williams and not 
based on the merits.  Sheppard felt that Judge Beerman, un-
der pressure from the prosecution, was railroading Williams.  
Sheppard stated at his deposition that the prosecutor was up-
set about the lenient sentence Williams previously had re-
ceived in a related drug case, and the negative publicity gen-
erated thereby.  Sheppard also believed that Judge Beerman 
had unfairly accommodated the prosecution‘s request to de-
lay the trial until January on the notion that a trial during the 
holiday season would be less likely to result in a conviction. 
On the morning of December 7, 1990, Sheppard came to 
chambers and declared that he would not work on the speedy 
trial motion in the Williams case because of his belief that 
the defendant was being ―railroaded.‖  Beerman responded 
that, although Sheppard was not being discharged, if he felt 
that way he should seek other employment. 
In response, Sheppard called Judge Beerman a ―corrupt 
son of a bitch,‖ but he quickly apologized for the characteri-
zation.  Sheppard then informed Beerman that he had pre-
served extensive notes of other judicial misconduct by Beer-
man during the preceding four years.  When asked by Judge 
Beerman to provide examples, Sheppard noted a case that 
Beerman had allegedly assigned to himself in order to exact 
revenge against the accused.  He told Judge Beerman that he 
would go public with the notes if he was forced to resign.  
Then Judge Beerman called Sheppard ―disturbed‖ and ―dis-
loyal.‖  After the confrontation, Sheppard offered to go home 
but Judge Beerman instructed him to work the rest of the day, 
which he did. 
Judge Beerman testified during his deposition that he 
conferred with his son, an attorney, that evening, and decided 
that he and Sheppard should part ways.  Judge Beerman also 
testified that he had resolved to speak with Administrative 
Judge Alfred Lerner about the incident when he returned to 
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the courthouse on the following Monday, December 10, 
1990. 
Sheppard did not show up for work that Monday.  On 
Tuesday, December 11, Judge Beerman met with Judge 
Lerner about the incident.  Judge Lerner was astonished by 
Sheppard‘s behavior and confirmed Judge Beerman‘s view 
that Sheppard could no longer remain in either Judge Beer-
man‘s employ, or indeed, in the employ of the court system. 
When Sheppard arrived at work on December 11, four 
days after the confrontation, court officers informed him that 
Judge Beerman had fired him.  Sheppard was forced to leave 
immediately and was not allowed to take his belongings with 
him.  Several days later, Sheppard was permitted to return to 




The opinion quoted above is the third (and final) Second Circuit opi-
nion in the Sheppard case.
255
  The first Sheppard appellate opinion 
provides additional detail: 
Both before and after his discharge . . . Sheppard‘s property 
was searched by Beerman or by others at his direction.  Spe-
cifically, Sheppard‘s file cabinets and desk drawers were 
searched, and a box of his personal file cards was seized and 
removed to Beerman‘s private office and examined . . . .   
Following his discharge, Sheppard returned to Beerman‘s 
courtroom on a number of occasions.  On January 18, 1991, 
while attending Beerman‘s calendar call, Sheppard began 
ruffling through court files.  Beerman subsequently directed 
him to leave the courtroom if he wished to examine docu-
ments.  On January 28, 1991, Beerman told an attorney not to 
speak with Sheppard and warned Sheppard not to involve 
himself in the cases Sheppard had worked on when he was a 
clerk.  On February 11, 1991, Sheppard was told not to keep 
  
254. Id. 
255. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Sheppard 
I]; Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823 (2d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Sheppard II].  
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coming in and out of the courtroom, and was told to be quiet 
when he sought to reply to this direction.
256
 
Sheppard sued Judge Beerman, asserting, among other things, that 
the judge violated his right to free speech under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.
257
   
In affirming the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to 
Judge Beerman, the court of appeals pointed out that ―[a] govern-
ment official may . . . fire an employee for speaking on a matter of 
public concern if the employee‘s speech is reasonably likely to dis-
rupt the effective functioning of the office, and the employee is fired 
to prevent this disruption.‖258  In holding that Judge Beerman‘s pre-
diction that Sheppard‘s speech would be disruptive, the court ex-
plained: 
We stated in Sheppard II that ―[i]f a judge cannot believe that 
his clerk is competent, loyal, and discreet, the working rela-
tionship between the two is not just injured, it is nonexis-
tent.‖  94 F.3d at 829.  Indeed, in their role as employees, law 
clerks amount to ―extensions of the judges at whose pleasure 
they serve.‖  Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Oliva v. Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987)).  Thus, at the very minimum, a respectful, if not con-
genial, relationship between clerk and judge is a prerequisite 
to a productive work environment within a judge‘s chambers. 
During the incident in question, it is undisputed that 
Sheppard yelled at Judge Beerman and called him an obscene 
epithet.  Sheppard‘s outburst was grossly disrespectful and an 
expression of personal contempt for Judge Beerman.  Given 
the nature of the judge-clerk relationship, we conclude that 
Judge Beerman‘s prediction that Sheppard‘s outburst would 





256. Sheppard I, 18 F.3d at 150. 
257. Sheppard III, 317 F.3d at 354. 
258. Id. at 355 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); Jeffries v. 
Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
259. Sheppard III, 317 F.3d at 355. 
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The court continued: 
For similar reasons, we find that the potential disruptive-
ness to Judge Beerman‘s chambers outweighed whatever 
value there was in Sheppard‘s speech.  The vitriolic manner 
in which Sheppard expressed himself, regardless of the sub-
stance of his remarks, made a harmonious working relation-
ship between Sheppard and Beerman difficult to imagine.  
Sheppard‘s use of the word ―corrupt‖ and his several refer-
ences to Beerman‘s alleged misconduct during his invective 
are not of sufficient import to outweigh the potential disrup-
tion his outburst caused. 
Where an employee, such as Sheppard, ―holds an ex-
tremely confidential or highly placed advisory position, it 
would be unlikely [for] the Pickering balance . . . to be struck 
in his favor.‖  McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 
1997).  Sheppard was undoubtedly in such a position here, 




One would think that most law clerks would be able to predict, with-
out the benefit of an opinion from a federal court of appeals, that job 
security is not enhanced by calling a judge a ―corrupt son of a bitch.‖  
But now we know for certain. 
Jakomas v. McFalls
261
 involved a less histrionic law clerk and a 
seemingly much more culpable judge.
262
  The plaintiffs in that case, 
―the former tipstaff, law clerk, and secretary for Judge Patrick H. 
McFalls, Jr., of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania,‖263 alleged that they ―observed behavior indicating 
that Judge McFalls was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
while performing his official duties.‖264  More specifically, they al-
leged that on one occasion, ―he arrived late to court, dressed in vaca-
  
260. Id. at 355–56 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
261. 229 F. Supp. 2d 412 (W.D. Pa. 2002). 
262. Id. at 416. 
263. Id.  Sadly, I still have no clue what a ―tipstaff‖ might be, thus raising the 
possibility—however slight—that I might be one myself, without even knowing it. 
264. Id. at 417. 
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tion clothes and sandals and still under the influence of alcohol,‖265 
and that ―[d]uring the course of [a] jury trial, a bottle of vodka 
dropped out of his pocket in front of people.‖266  Concerned about 
the situation, ―Barbara Joseph [the judge‘s secretary and husband of 
the judge‘s law clerk, James Joseph] confronted Judge McFalls 
about his use of alcohol [and,] [a]ccording to the Amended Com-
plaint, the Judge replied ‗Are you threatening me?‘‖267  Thereafter, 
the secretary and law clerk told an administrative judge that Judge 
McFalls ―was drunk at times while on the bench and while deciding 
cases.‖268  Subsequently: 
[Administrative] Judge James and President Judge Robert 
Kelly scheduled a meeting with Judge McFalls to be held 
upon his return from the Cayman Islands.  Judge James told 
the plaintiffs that he would confront Judge McFalls and give 
him the opportunity to go to alcohol rehabilitation.  If he re-
fused, then Judge James would report the conduct to the Su-
preme Court. 
On November 13, 2001, the plaintiffs telephoned Judge 
McFalls in the Cayman Islands, and told him that Judge 
James wanted to see him as soon as he returned.  James Jo-
seph told the Judge that he should be prepared because the 
meeting was called to discuss his drinking behavior. 
On the morning of November 14, 2001, an Allegheny 
County Deputy Sheriff handed Barbara Joseph two enve-
lopes—one for herself and one for her husband James.  The 
letters, dated November 13, 2001, stated: ―Effective imme-
diately, you are discharged from your position.‖ 
The deputy sheriff then escorted Barbara Joseph from the 
building, telling her that he had been ―instructed to deposit 
[her] on the sidewalk outside the building.‖  According to the 




267. Jakomas, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 417. 
268. Id. at 418. 
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seph and told him: ―I had to carpet bomb you, because you 
wanted to send me to rehabilitation.‖269 
In response to being carpet bombed, Judge McFalls‘s former secre-
tary and law clerk (along with the tipstaff) sued ―Judge McFalls in 
both his official and individual capacities‖ and Allegheny County, 
asserting a free-speech claim under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and a claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower 
law.
270
  Both defendants moved to dismiss, and, of the various 
claims asserted, the court dismissed all but the free-speech claim 
against Judge McFalls in his individual capacity.
271
 
The law clerk in Graves v. Wayne County Third Circuit Court,
272
 
Karen Graves, claimed that she was fired for missing too much time 
due to her pregnancy.
273
  She sued the court in which she had 
worked and the judge for whom she had worked, under Title VII.
274
  
The defendants moved to dismiss, and prevailed, on grounds that, as 
a law clerk, Graves was not an employee for purposes of Title VII.
275
  
In Childress v. United States,
276
 a pro se law clerk ―employed by the 
District Court for the District of South Carolina‖277 responded to his 
termination by filing suit in state court against the Chief Deputy 
Clerk of the federal court.
278
  Specifically, he ―allege[d] that Defen-
dant Donelan prepared a performance appraisal containing defama-
tory statements and that these statements tortiously interfered with 
his employment contract.‖279  Childress‘s suit took a brief detour, 
but ended up going nowhere: ―The United States Attorney‘s office 
  
269. Id.  As I have indicated, the facts of this case were not proven by affidavit or 
at trial but were drawn from the complaint.  Still, one might reasonably assume 
that there was least some fire to accompany the smoke, given that Judge McFalls 
resigned his judicial office as part of an agreement to settle formal charges filed 
against him by the Judicial Conduct Board.  Id. at 419. 
270. Id. at 416. 
271. Id. at 431. 
272. No. 08-11168, 2008 WL 3318726 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2008). 
273. Id. at *1.  
274. Id. 
275. Id. at *3. 
276. No. 3:07-cv-03312, 2008 WL 6716458 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2008). 
277. Id. at *1.  
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
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removed the case from state court to the federal district court.‖280  In 
federal court, Donelan successfully moved to substitute the United 
States as the defendant in the case,
281
 and then the United States was 
granted dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity.
282
 
Perhaps the most interesting instance of law-clerk litigation is the 
one that unfolded in the District of Arizona.  It is impossible to im-
prove on the narrative provided by Judge Frederick Martone: 
This is an action by Luz Hellman against Judge Sheldon 
Weisberg pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of 
her First Amendment rights, and against the State of Arizona 
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Arizona Civil 
Rights Act, A.R.S. §§ 41-1461-67, alleging retaliation. 
. . . .  
Hellman worked at the Arizona Court of Appeals as a 
judicial assistant to Judge Jefferson Lankford.  She married 
him in 2001, and then resigned.  In 2003, she rejoined the 
court to work as a judicial assistant to Judge Donn Kessler.  
She stated that she was ―finally in a position to get some 
things changed around here,‖ that she was going to ―stir the 
pot,‖ ―do something about Judge [Susan] Ehrlich,‖ and was 
―in the process of contacting Judge Ehrlich‘s former law 
clerks.‖  
In 2005, Hellman met Regina Pangerl, a law clerk for 
Judge Ehrlich.  Pangerl told Hellman that Judge Ehrlich had 
made discriminatory comments about Pangerl‘s Mormon re-
ligion.  Hellman took it upon herself to contact Keith Stott, 
the Executive Director of the Arizona Commission on Judi-
cial Conduct, to discuss the matter.  She later accompanied 
Pangerl to meet with Stott so that Pangerl could file a com-
plaint against Judge Ehrlich.  Eventually, Pangerl transferred 
from Judge Ehrlich‘s chambers to Judge Weisberg‘s cham-
bers for the remainder of her clerkship term.  On November 
4, 2005, Pangerl filed a charge of discrimination with the 
  
280. Id. 
281. Id. at *5. 
282. Childress, 2008 WL 6716458, at *5.  
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖) 
against the State of Arizona, claiming religious discrimina-
tion and harassment by Judge Ehrlich. 
On November 23, 2005, Judge Weisberg, then Chief 
Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, wrote a memoran-
dum informing his judicial colleagues of Pangerl‘s EEOC 
claim.  Judge Weisberg‘s memorandum was marked 
―CONFIDENTIAL‖ and provided, ―[o]f course, it goes with-
out saying, that this is a confidential matter.‖  He stated that 
―[b]ased upon the information and knowledge available to 
me, I do not believe any of Pangerl‘s allegations.‖  He asked 
the other judges to ―contact [him] immediately if [they had] 
any information relevant to Pangerl‘s Charge of Discrimina-
tion.  The memorandum was delivered to each Court of Ap-
peals judge in an envelope marked ―confidential.‖  On No-
vember 25, 2005, Judge Lankford wrote a memorandum in 
response to Judge Weisberg‘s, which he delivered in an 
envelope marked ―confidential.‖  On November 27, 2005, 
without obtaining permission from either judge, Hellman 
made copies of the Weisberg and Lankford memoranda and 
gave them to Pangerl.  The next day an Associated Press re-
porter contacted Judge Weisberg about the judges‘ memo-
randa, and later that day an Associated Press story revealed 
content from both memoranda. 
After the memoranda were delivered to Pangerl and 
leaked to the press, Hellman arranged a meeting with Judges 
Weisberg, Kessler, and Gemmill to confess her role in the 
leak.  She tape-recorded the meeting without the judges‘ 
knowledge or consent.  She admitted that she understood that 
she was ―gonna get the eye from a lot of people, and [was] 
okay with that.‖  She was insolent and rude to Judge Weis-
berg and called the Court of Appeals a ―gutless court that has 
very little integrity.‖  She displayed a shockingly inappro-
priate understanding of her role at the court. 
In response to her misappropriation and disclosure of the 
memoranda, Judge Weisberg informed the other judges that 
only Judge Kessler, her direct supervisor, had disciplinary 
power over her.  Exercising remarkable restraint, Judge Kess-
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ler chose not to terminate her for her gross insubordination.  
Many employers would have escorted her out of the building.  
He did conclude that her release of the two court memoranda 
violated the Arizona Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees 
and Rule 123, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, both of 
which require employees and judges to maintain the confi-
dentiality of court and personnel information.  Judge Kessler 
informed Hellman that her disclosure of confidential court 
memoranda could be deemed theft under state law, and stated 
that he would put a note in her personnel file regarding the 
incident. 
Hellman claims that she suffered retaliation as a result of 
disclosing the memoranda.  She claims that she was repri-
manded, threatened with termination and criminal prosecu-
tion, and shunned by her co-workers.  She complained to 
Judge Kessler about a hostile and retaliatory work environ-
ment.  Judge Kessler in turn reported the complaints to Judge 
Weisberg.  Hellman claims to have experienced gastrointes-
tinal problems, stress, and other medical problems. 
On January 5, 2006, Hellman filed a charge of discrimi-
nation with the EEOC claiming retaliation for engaging in 
protected activity, which she described as ―providing two 
memorandums [sic] to an employee who had filed a charge 
of discrimination with the EEOC.‖   The Court of Appeals 
engaged an independent lawyer to investigate Hellman‘s al-
legations.  That lawyer concluded that Hellman‘s retaliation 
allegations were unsubstantiated.  In late September 2006, 
Hellman resigned as a result of the ―continued ostracization 
that she suffered.‖283 
Hellman‘s suit made it out of the starting gate but got nowhere near 
the finish line; Judge Martone granted the defendants‘ motions for 
summary judgment.
284
  He ruled that the disclosure of confidential 
  
283. Hellman v. Weisberg, No. CV-06-1465-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 4218973, at 
*1–2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 3, 2007), aff’d, 360 F. App’x. 776 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnotes 
and citations to the record omitted). 
284. Id. at *10. 
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information, in clear violation of Hellman‘s duties as a law clerk, 
was not a protected activity for purposes of a Title VII retaliation 
claim,
285
 and that, for purposes of her First Amendment claim, the 
misappropriation and disclosure of confidential memoranda between 
judges was not constitutionally protected speech.
286
  For those of you 





IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Every courtroom I have ever worked in has a special little desk 
just for law clerks.  But the lesson of this article is that, under the 
right circumstances, law clerks can pop up almost anywhere else in a 
courtroom, from the gallery to the witness box to the tables reserved 
for litigants and their counsel.
288
  From my survey of law clerks out 
of context, I have been able to distill some small bits of advice for 
those who work at the elbows of judges.   
First, for those who are disinclined to produce affidavits or to 
testify, the best way to avoid being called on to give evidence is to 
avoid having evidence to give.  Given the typical subject matter of 
law-clerk testimony, one of the best ways to remain untainted by 
potential evidence is to avoid or minimize contact with litigants and 
their counsel.  Generally speaking, what happens in chambers stays 
in chambers, but when law clerks communicate with people outside 
chambers, they create the possibility of being asked to give evidence 
about their communications.  So, for all you law clerks out there, 
  
285. Id. at *5. 
286. Id. at *9. 
287. Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App‘x. 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009). 
288. Beyond that, there are legions of law clerks who have ended up in the best 
seat in the house, on the bench, serving as judges.  See Lucas v. United States, Cr. 
No. 3:05-0760-MBS, 2010 WL 412554, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2010) (―The depo-
sition of Judge Brian W. Jeffcoat, another former law clerk of Judge Westbrook . . 
. .‖); Frances R. Hill, Constitutive Voting and Participatory Association: Con-
tested Constitutional Claims in Primary Elections, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 535, 571 
(2010) (noting that William Rehnquist once served as a law clerk to Justice Robert 
Jackson).  One former law clerk who later landed on the bench is my father in law, 
Herbert L. Chabot, who was the third U.S. Tax Court law clerk to later serve as a 
Tax Court judge. 
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tight lips can help keep you out of the witness box.  If, however, you 
cannot keep your lips buttoned because, for example, your judge 
directs you to have contact with litigants or attorneys, it is always a 
good idea not to say or write anything you would not be comfortable 
reading in the Federal Reporter.   
On the other hand, for those who might enjoy a trip to the wit-
ness box, the trick is to have evidence to give.  There are not many 
opportunities to acquire useful evidence, and the best ones arise 
when you are sitting in the courtroom.  Resist the urge to let your 
mind wander, and keep an eagle eye on the litigants, the attorneys, 
and the jury.  You just might see something the court will need to 
know about later.   
My final piece of advice is for potential law-clerk plaintiffs.  
Save yourself the filing fee.  The courthouse is, indisputably, a great 
place to work, but the courtroom is rarely a good place to seek relief 
when your dream job turns into a nightmare.  
 
